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Trends and Prior Evidence 
Employee ownership is a situation in which employees have an 
ownership stake in the firm where they work, through holdings of firm 
stock. It is a channel through which employees share in the profits of 
the firm and can vote on important firm decisions and otherwise have 
increased participation in workplace decisions. The focus of this book 
is on broad-based employee ownership—that is, ownership of stock not 
just by top-level managers but by workers at all levels of a firm’s hier-
archy. The past several decades have witnessed growth in broad-based 
employee participation in the financial performance of firms, both in the 
United States and in other advanced countries. 
WHY DO WE CARE? 
There are four broad sources of interest in employee ownership: 
1) Increased economic performance. Since employee owner-
ship shares the overall pie with employees of the firm, par-
ticipation in employee ownership can motivate employees to 
work harder to increase the size of the pie, primarily through 
increased productivity. Employee ownership can thus alle-
viate principal-agent problems in the workplace. By tying 
worker pay to profits, the incentives of workers and owners 
can become aligned so that productivity-reducing conflict is 
minimized and productivity-enhancing cooperation and inno-
vation are encouraged. Better outcomes can occur through 
higher worker effort, lower absenteeism and turnover, and 
greater worker commitment and willingness to share infor-
mation and cooperate with management. There should be 
especially strong effects if employee ownership is combined 
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2 Kurtulus and Kruse 
with employee participation in decisions (combining “residual 
control” with “residual returns”) (Holmstrom and Milgrom 
1994; Jensen and Meckling 1992; Milgrom and Roberts 1990;
Prendergast 2002). 
2) Greater job security and firm survival. Employee ownership 
may enhance firm survival and employment stability, through 
greater compensation flexibility and higher productivity. If so, 
this can help decrease unemployment and increase macroeco-
nomic stability in the overall economy, creating positive exter-
nalities that can justify supportive public policy. 
3) More-broadly shared prosperity. Employee ownership can 
broaden access to capital income and broaden the distribution 
of income and wealth. The notion of workers sharing in firm 
profits has historical roots in the infancy of U.S. capitalism. 
The founders of the United States believed that broad shar-
ing in ownership and economic rewards was vital to a thriving 
democracy (Blasi, Freeman, and Kruse 2013). Albert Gallatin, 
before becoming U.S. Treasury secretary under Thomas Jeffer-
son, instituted a profit-sharing plan in 1795 at his Pennsylvania 
Glass Works, with the belief that such a system was impor-
tant for the newly developing U.S. democracy. Broadening 
the distribution of wealth was a key reason for the creation of 
employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) by Louis Kelso and 
their institutionalization in the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), spearheaded by Sen. Russell 
Long of Louisiana. 
4) Lower labor-management conflict and higher quality of 
work life. Employee ownership may help to create a more 
harmonious work site, with less labor-management conflict 
because of increased alignment of incentives. Employees may 
also benefit from increased job security and control of their 
work lives. To the extent that employee ownership increases 
employee participation in workplace decisions, this may also 
help to strengthen democracy by increasing employees’ civic 
skills and interest in participating in politics, as argued by the 
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Because of the above sources of interest, a number of countries 
give tax incentives to promote employee ownership. The European 
Union (EU) highlighted employee ownership and profit sharing in its 
four reports from 1991 to 2008 known as the PEPPER (Promotion of 
Employee Participation in Profits and Enterprise Results) Reports. It 
called on member states to promote participation by employed per-
sons in profits and enterprise performance. Employee ownership can 
improve individual firm performance, which provides a rationale for 
firms to adopt these performance-enhancing practices, and public pol-
icy can play a valuable role in spreading this information. Furthermore, 
there is a very strong case to be made for supportive public policy of 
employee ownership if employee ownership firms lay off fewer work-
ers and are more likely to survive, since the economic and social costs 
of layoffs and firm failures are borne by workers, families, communi-
ties, and the larger economy and society. In economic terms, the layoffs 
and firm failures create negative externalities that can justify the use of 
supportive public policies. In addition, a policy case can be built on the 
third source of interest listed above—increasing broad-based prosper-
ity, which can reduce inequality and strengthen democracy. We discuss 
the policy implications further in the concluding chapter, taking all of 
these arguments into account. 
There are nonetheless concerns about employee ownership that 
may limit the interest of companies and policymakers. The two princi-
pal concerns are these: 
1) The free rider problem. The individual incentive to be a “free 
rider” in group incentives grows with the size of the group. 
This is also often called the “1/N problem,” since in a group 
incentive plan with N workers the average worker will receive 
only 1/N of the extra rewards generated by his or her individ-
ual effort. This may be counteracted by workplace norms and 
company policies to encourage cooperation, higher effort, and 
monitoring of fellow workers, as will be discussed. 
2) Financial risk. Stock values can obviously go up and down, 
and having a large share of one’s wealth in any one asset— 
including the stock of one’s employer—means that one may 
face financial risk by not being appropriately diversified. The 
financial risk may be increased under employee ownership, 
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and the company stock value. While this is an important con-
cern and deserves attention in policy, we will review theoreti-
cal and empirical evidence that it does not appear to be a major 
problem in practice. 
PLAN OF THE BOOK 
This book presents new evidence focused on the second major 
source of interest listed above: the stability and survival of employee-
ownership firms. These topics are the most relevant to discussions of 
public policy support for employee ownership, given the potential 
broader benefits for the economy and society. In the remainder of this 
chapter, we provide an overview of the major types of employee owner-
ship and prior evidence relevant to each of the four sources of interest 
and the two main objections. Following a brief history and overview of 
the prevalence of employee ownership in Chapter 2, we present new 
data on the relationship of employee ownership to employment stabil-
ity in Chapter 3, and of employee ownership to firm survival in Chapter 
4. We further probe these results in Chapter 5 in order to understand 
the role of compensation flexibility and higher productivity as potential 
explanations for the greater stability and survival of employee owner-
ship firms. Apart from helping us interpret the stability and survival 
results, the evidence in Chapter 5 also sheds light on the first source of 
interest identified above—improving economic performance—by ana-
lyzing the relationship of employee ownership to productivity, and it 
sheds light on the financial risk objection by assessing pay levels and 
flexibility in employee ownership companies. Chapter 6 concludes with 
a summary of our key results and their implications for public policy. 
WHAT IS MEANT BY “EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP”? 
There is great variety in the types and extent of employee owner-
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three dimensions: 1) the percentage of the company owned by employ-
ees (from a minority stake to 100 percent ownership), 2) the percentage 
of employees who participate in ownership (from a minority to 100 per-
cent), and 3) the distribution of shares among employee owners (from 
perfect equality to a very unequal distribution where one manager owns 
the majority of stock and each of the other employees owns only a small 
amount). Regarding Dimension 1, in this study we measure the percent-
age of publicly held companies owned by broad-based plans, so that we 
can examine the effects of the percentage of company owned. Because 
they are publicly held companies, none are 100 percent employee 
owned, and most have only a small percentage owned by employees. 
Regarding Dimensions 2 and 3, we include only broad-based employee 
ownership as defined by pension rules governing coverage, so that all or 
most employees will be included and the distribution of ownership will 
generally be proportional to pay and tenure. 
Overall, an estimated 22.9 million employees, or almost one-fifth of 
U.S. private sector employees, own stock in the companies they work 
for (the prevalence will be explored more fully in Chapter 2). Employee 
ownership programs can take several different forms, summarized in 
Table 1.1. 
• One of the most prevalent forms of employee ownership in the 
United States is the ESOP. In an ESOP, ERISA allows compa-
nies to contribute company stock, or money to buy stock, to an 
Table 1.1  Population Covered by Various Employee Ownership Plans 
Types of employee ownership Number of employees covered in U.S. 
ESOPs 10.6 million 
401(k) plans 5.7 million 
Other pension plans 184,000 
Employee stock purchase plans Unknown 
Worker cooperatives About 7,500 
Individual purchases on open market Unknown 
Stock held after exercising 8.5 million stock option holders, 
stock options though the number holding stock after 
exercising their option is unknown 
Any employee ownership 22.9 million 
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation. 
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employee pension trust, or to borrow money to fund employee 
ownership and then repay it in installments from company rev-
enues. Under this approach, workers generally gain an owner-
ship stake without investing their own money to buy the stock 
(although in a small minority of cases they have taken wage or 
benefit concessions to fund the stock purchase) (Blasi and Kruse 
1991). As of 2012, there were 10.6 million employee partici-
pants in ESOPs (USDOL 2015). 
Apart from ESOPs, employee ownership may occur through the 
following ways: 
• In 401(k) retirement pension plans, companies may match pre-
tax employee contributions with company stock, and employees 
may choose to invest some of their own contributions in com-
pany stock. As of 2012, there were 5.7 million employee partici-
pants in non-ESOP 401(k) plans with employer stock (Table 2.2 
in Chapter 2). 
• In other pension plans, such as deferred profit-sharing plans with-
out a 401(k) option, the company invests a portion of the profit-
sharing contribution into company stock. These are rare: in 2012, 
there were only 184,000 participants in non-ESOP, non-401(k) 
pension plans with employer stock (Table 2.2 in Chapter 2). 
• Employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs) typically offer stock 
at a 10 to 15 percent discount to the stock market price so that 
employees can acquire ownership through individual decisions 
to purchase company stock. About half of all large companies in 
the United States offer ESPPs, and an average of 30 percent of 
employees in these companies participate in the ESPP (Babenko 
and Sen 2014). 
• Worker cooperatives are 100 percent—or nearly 100 percent— 
worker-owned companies in which workers invest in owner-
ship stakes and typically make decisions based on one-person/ 
one-vote, rather than having voting rights based on number of 
shares of stock. These are much less common than other forms 
of employee ownership; an attempted census of U.S. coopera-
tives found that they had a total of only about 7,500 employees 
in 2009 (Deller et al. 2009), although they are more common in 
several other countries. 
Introduction: Trends and Prior Evidence  7 
• Employees can make individual purchases of company stock on 
the open market. 
• Employees can exercise their stock options. Stock options give 
them the right to buy company stock at a preset strike price after 
a specific vesting period. Once the vesting period is over, the 
worker has the choice to exercise the stock option—i.e., to exer-
cise his or her right to buy the stock at the preset strike price and 
sell at the going market stock price. The worker will have an 
incentive to exercise the stock option when the market price is 
above the strike price and thereby obtain a positive payoff. In this 
way, the employee gets the upside gain of a rise in share price 
without the downside risk of losing part of his or her investment. 
An important point is that stock-option holdings only consti-
tute employee ownership if and when they are exercised, which 
would only occur when the stock price goes above the strike 
price and the exerciser exercises the option but continues to hold 
the stock. Thus, stock options could lead to employee ownership, 
but they do not strictly constitute employee ownership in and of 
themselves. Therefore, when we present descriptive statistics or 
figures on stock options in this book, we will always treat stock 
options separately rather than including them in our statistics 
or figures on employee ownership. Unlike direct purchases of 
company stock, stock options are not purchased with employee 
savings unless they are used for wage substitution. While stock 
options are most common in executive compensation, a number 
of companies—particularly high-tech companies—have imple-
mented broad-based plans that distribute stock options to all 
or most employees. As of 2014, there were about 8.5 million 
employees holding stock options (Table 2.1 in Chapter 2). 
WHAT DOES THE EVIDENCE SHOW? 
Previous empirical research has shown employee ownership to be 
linked to a multitude of improved outcomes. There are several alterna-
tive methods that have been used in this research: 
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• Compare employee owners to individuals who are not employee 
owners. 
• Compare outcomes at firms that have employee ownership to 
otherwise comparable firms that do not have such programs. 
• Follow firms longitudinally and compare them before and after 
adoption of employee ownership relative to firms that did not 
adopt employee ownership. 
• Employ laboratory or field experiments to examine the link 
between financial participation and performance outcomes. 
On the following pages is an overview of prior evidence for each of 
the four major sources of interest—1) increased economic performance,
2) greater job security and firm survival, 3) shared prosperity, and 
4) lower labor-management conflict and higher quality of work life— 
and for the two major objections (free riding and financial risk). We 
start each section with some results from the General Social Survey 
(GSS), which illustrate the basic relationship between employee owner-
ship and outcomes of interest, and then provide more detail on the in-
depth scholarly research. The GSS is a nationally representative survey 
conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University 
of Chicago. The GSS is conducted every two years on approximately 
1,500 adults and includes questions on a wide variety of topics on 
social, demographic, and economic factors, such as political and civic 
participation, life satisfaction, and work habits. The GSS included sev-
eral questions on employee ownership, stock options, and profit shar-
ing in 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014, which are useful in illustrating the 
trends and potential effects of these pay systems.1 
Economic performance. The GSS results in Figure 1.1 are con-
sistent with the popular view that employees tend to work harder and 
raise productivity under employee ownership. Survey respondents were 
asked how hard they thought their coworkers worked. Respondents 
who were employee owners reported that their coworkers had higher 
average effort (on a 0–10 scale) than was reported by employee non-
owners. It is important to note that this question does not reveal whether 
the other workers at the respondent’s workplace also participate in 
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Not employee owner 
2002 2006 
NOTE: Data are based on responses to the General Social Survey (GSS) variable 
cowrkhrd, which asks, “At your workplace, how hard would you say that people 
work, with 0 meaning not at all hard and 10 meaning very hard?” (The GSS asked this 
question only in 2002 and 2006.) This figure illustrates mean response by employee 
ownership. 
SOURCE: Data are from the GSS on employees at private firms. 
be implemented at the workplace level, so it is likely that most of an 
employee-owner respondent’s coworkers are also employee owners. 
The results of this simple comparison are consistent with prior stud-
ies that demonstrate a positive association between employee owner-
ship and company performance. Two reviews of the employee owner-
ship literature have concluded that “two-thirds of 129 studies (including 
both performance and attitude studies) on employee ownership and its 
consequences found favorable effects relating to employee owner-
ship, while one-tenth found negative effects” (Kaarsemaker 2006) and 
“research on ESOPs and employee ownership is overwhelmingly posi-
tive and largely credible” (Freeman 2007). Formal meta-analyses that 
statistically test the combined results of studies have found strong evi-
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formance (Doucouliagos 1995; Kruse and Blasi 1997; O’Boyle, Patel, 
and Gonzalez-Mulé, forthcoming). 
Examples of individual studies include one sponsored by the United 
Kingdom Treasury (Oxera Consulting 2007a,b,c) that aimed to under-
stand whether government policies that encouraged firms to introduce 
employee ownership improved firm performance. The study obtained 
data from confidential tax records, and its examination of tax-advantaged
share schemes at more than 16,000 UK firms reveals that broad-based 
employee ownership improves firm performance measures such as 
value-added and turnover. A parallel study using publicly available 
data on British corporations with broad-based employee ownership 
finds similar results. It also finds that the effects were greatly influenced 
by the delegation of decision-making autonomy from management to 
employees (Bryson and Freeman 2010). Also, Jones and Kato (1995) 
examine the effect of broad-based employee stock ownership plans by 
estimating production functions using a panel of Japanese firms; they 
find that the introduction of an ESOP resulted in a 4–5 percent increase 
in productivity and that this productivity payoff took from three to four 
years to actualize. In the United States, a study by Blasi, Freeman, and 
Kruse (2013) examined 300 privately held firms that set up ESOPs 
between 1988 and 1994, comparing each ESOP firm to a similar com-
pany of the same size and in the same industry without an ESOP. This 
study finds that ESOP firms have significantly higher sales growth and 
higher sales per worker than matching firms without ESOPs. 
Of course, correlation does not imply causation. For example, com-
panies may have good performance even before adopting employee 
ownership, so that good performance is a cause rather than consequence 
of employee ownership. To address this possibility, many studies have 
used longitudinal data that compare performance before and after the 
adoption of a plan, or that examine other variation in employee owner-
ship over time (e.g., in percentage covered or size of stakes), and have 
found that performance improves after employee ownership is adopted 
or expanded. While these studies control for anything special about the 
firm that does not change over time, there may be other factors that 
affect the firm’s choice of when to adopt a participatory pay plan, and 
that may be responsible for any performance changes. To address this 
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to adjust for any statistical bias, and these studies have continued to find 
generally positive results.2 
Another potentially confounding factor is that higher-quality work-
ers may be more likely to join participatory pay firms, and the higher 
firm performance may be due to the presence of better workers rather 
than the direct effect of employee ownership. If employee ownership 
does attract better workers, this could be a good reason for an individual 
firm to adopt employee ownership, but it does not provide a strong case 
for policy support, since any expansion of employee ownership may be 
essentially reshuffling workers among firms and not raising overall per-
formance of the economy. While this issue of worker self-selection has 
not been examined in the context of employee ownership, there have 
been two studies of other group incentives that have found that aver-
age worker quality does not change as compensation is changed from 
individual to group incentives, whereas average worker performance 
improves under the group incentives (Hansen 1997; Weiss 1987). 
The interpretation that employee ownership increases productivity 
on average is supported by findings on employees’ performance-related 
behaviors. A study of over 40,000 workers finds that those who owned 
company stock are more likely to say they would take action if they saw 
a fellow worker not working well, by talking to the worker, a supervi-
sor, or members of the work team (Freeman, Kruse, and Blasi 2010). 
This result occurred both before and after controlling for a wide variety 
of job and personal characteristics. The idea that shared rewards is a 
causal factor was strongly supported in employee reports of why they 
would take such actions (e.g., “Poor performance will cost me and other 
employees in bonus or stock value”). Employee owners also reported 
lower levels of turnover, more pride and loyalty to the company, greater 
willingness to work hard to help the company, and more suggestions 
to improve performance (Blasi et al. 2010). While this study does not 
find lower absenteeism among employee owners, a French study finds 
that employee ownership plans were linked to reductions in employee 
absenteeism (Brown, Fakhfakh, and Sessions 1999). 
All the studies described above are based on field research on actual 
firms and workers participating in employee ownership. While these 
studies control for many observable factors, it is always possible that 
there are some unobserved factors affecting the results. These unob-
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random assignment. While random assignment of employee owner-
ship in actual work settings would be extremely difficult to implement, 
laboratory experiments have found higher productivity among subjects 
randomly assigned to be in employee-owned “firms” (Frohlich et al. 
1998; Mellizo 2013), suggesting that there can be true causal effects of 
employee ownership on performance. 
Job Security and Firm Survival. The GSS results show that both 
actual layoffs (Figure 1.2) and the perceived likelihood of layoff (Figure 
1.3) are lower for employee-owners than for nonowners. As we can see 
in Figure 1.2, in each year, workers who participated in employee own-
ership programs indicated a lower incidence of losing their jobs than 
workers who were not employee owners. For example, in 2002, 3.0 
percent of employee owners reported being laid off from their jobs in 
the past year compared to 9.2 percent of non–employee owners. In each 




























Not employee owner 
2002 2006 2010 2014 
NOTE: Layoff information based on the GSS variable laidoff, which indicates whether 
the employee was laid off from his or her main job at any time in the past year. Figure 
illustrates mean response by employee ownership. 
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NOTE: Layoff information based on the GSS variable joblose, which asks the respon-
dent how likely he/she is to lose his/her job in the coming year. Responses “very 
likely” and “fairly likely” were coded as high layoff likelihood, while responses “not 
too likely” and “not at all likely” were coded as low layoff likelihood. Figure illus-
trates mean response by employee ownership. 
SOURCE: Data are from the GSS on employees at private firms. 
year, employee ownership participants also reported a lower likelihood 
of losing their jobs than workers who were not employee owners, as 
seen in Figure 1.3. For example, in 2002, 12.2 percent of GSS respon-
dents who were employee owners indicated a high layoff likelihood 
in the coming year (either “very likely” or “fairly likely”), while 15.3 
percent of non–employee owners reported a high layoff likelihood. The 
difference in actual layoffs is particularly strong in the Great Recession 
year of 2010, when 12.3 percent of nonowners reported being laid off 
in the past year compared to only 2.6 percent of employee owners. One 
potential criticism of the layoff comparisons is that this difference may 
reflect the greater average job tenure of employee owners, since the 
nonowners may be new employees who are more likely to be laid off 
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employees with more than one year of tenure, and when controlling for 
tenure, occupation, gender, race, age, and education. 
Employee ownership may be linked to lower layoffs because of 
enhanced company employment stability and survival. Employee owner-
ship may lead to this in at least four related ways, including 1) increasing 
productivity through greater cooperation, information sharing, and com-
mitment (Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan 1991); 2) reducing dysfunc-
tional workplace conflict that can contribute to firm failure; 3) increasing 
employee investments in valuable firm-specific skills; and 4) creating 
a workplace culture that instills a sense of psychological ownership, 
with a corresponding commitment to preserve employee jobs whenever 
possible. 
Prior evidence from U.S. studies shows that firms with employee 
ownership have higher survival rates: public companies with substantial 
employee ownership stakes in 1983 were 20 percent more likely than 
closely matched industry pairs to survive through 1995 (Blair, Kruse, 
and Blasi 2002), and those with substantial employee ownership stakes 
in 1988 were 21 percent more likely to survive through 2001 (Park, 
Kruse, and Sesil 2004). A study that focused on closely held firms used 
a similar methodology of matching ESOP and non-ESOP companies 
in the same industry and found that ESOP companies in 1988 were 
only half as likely as non-ESOP firms to go bankrupt or close over 
the 1988–1999 period, and only three-fifths as likely to disappear for 
any reason (Blasi, Freeman, and Kruse 2013). These three studies also 
found greater employment stability among the employee ownership 
firms compared to their same-industry pairs, as measured by the stan-
dard deviation of the logarithm of employment. Also, Welbourne and 
Cyr (1999) found that among companies with initial public offerings 
in 1988, those with broad-based employee ownership had higher sur-
vival rates. A study of S corporations with ESOPs over the 2006–2011 
period found that they had higher average employment growth in the 
2006–2008 prerecession period than did the economy as a whole, and 
they also had faster growth following the recession from 2009 to 2011 
(Brill 2012, p. 6). 
The greater stability of employee ownership firms is linked to sub-
stantially lower government costs for unemployment compensation and 
forgone tax revenues. An analysis based on the GSS results in combi-
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rates concludes that “based on the estimated cost of each unemployed 
worker, the implied federal savings from the lower layoff rates for 
employee owners is $23.3 billion for the recession year 2010 and $13.7 
billion per year for the longer 2002–2010 period” (Employee Owner-
ship Foundation 2013; Rosen 2013). 
Apart from these U.S. results on stability and survival, there have 
been four studies of worker cooperatives outside the United States that 
have found high survival rates compared to conventional firms. These 
were studies of worker cooperatives in several countries by Ben-Ner 
(1988), in the United Kingdom by Thomas and Cornforth (1989), in 
France by Pérotin (2004), and in Uruguay by Burdín (2014). The last 
of these studies analyzed a long panel of administrative firm-level data 
maintained by the government and found that worker cooperatives had 
a 29 percent lower rate of dissolution than did conventional firms, and 
that the higher survival rate is associated with greater employment 
stability. 
More-broadly shared prosperity. Employee ownership will not 
enhance worker incomes if it substitutes for standard worker pay or 
benefits. In this case it presents serious issues of financial risk, since 
variable pay is being substituted for fixed pay (although financial risk 
may nonetheless be reduced by greater job security, as will be dis-
cussed). While a common perception is that employee ownership will 
substitute for other forms of compensation, the evidence indicates that 
employee ownership tends to come on top of market levels of pay. The 
GSS data in Figure 1.4 provide a simple comparison to illustrate this 
point. Employee-owners are slightly more likely than non–employee 
owners to report that their fixed pay levels are at or above market levels, 
meaning that the employee ownership comes on top of market levels of 
fixed pay for most workers. 
There are some cases in which employee ownership is used as part 
of wage or benefit concessions, but these are rare (despite the media 
attention paid to several cases).3 A comprehensive longitudinal study 
of all ESOP adoptions over the period 1980–2001 finds that employee 
wages (excluding ESOP contributions) either increased (for small 
ESOPs) or stayed constant (for large ESOPs) after adoption, control-
ling for state-level and industry-level wage changes and other company 
characteristics (Kim and Ouimet 2014). Consistent with this, cross-
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Not employee owner 
Fixed pay at or above market Fixed pay above market 
NOTE: Data are based on the GSS variable compwage, which asks “Do you believe 
your fixed annual wages last year were higher or lower than those of employees with 
similar experience and job descriptions in other companies in your region? Please 
answer on a 1-to-5 scale.” Responses of “4” or “5” were classified as “fixed pay 
above market,” and answers of “3” or more were classified as “fixed pay at or above 
market.” Figure illustrates mean response by employee ownership. 
SOURCE: Data are from the 2014 wave of the GSS on employees at private firms. 
sectional comparisons of matched ESOP and non-ESOP firms have 
found similar levels of pay and other benefits in the two types of firms, 
so that ESOPs appear to come on top of other worker pay and benefits 
(Kardas, Scharf, and Keogh 1998; Scharf and Mackin 2000). 
Apart from ESOPs, employee ownership in general is linked to 
higher overall pay. More detailed analysis of the GSS data, with con-
trols for job and demographic characteristics, finds that employee own-
ers have higher levels of yearly earnings and are more likely to say 
they are “paid what they deserve” and that their fringe benefits are 
good (Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi 2010, p. 266). Other cross-sectional 
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age compensation levels (Blasi, Conte, and Kruse 1996), pension assets
(Kroumova 2000), and overall worker wealth (Buchele et al. 2010). 
For example, a study of more than 40,000 workers finds that an 
extra dollar of employee ownership value is associated with an extra 94 
cents of wealth, indicating that there is very little substitution between 
employee ownership and other forms of wealth; thus, employee-owned 
stock appears to add to wealth in general (Buchele et al. 2010). While 
some of these forms of employee ownership involve workers directly 
purchasing stock (such as in Employee Stock Purchase Plans), such 
purchases are generally done on favorable terms for the employees 
(e.g., with discounts). The clear evidence that ESOP participants receive 
stock on top of regular compensation, and that employee owners in gen-
eral receive higher pay, indicates that employee ownership generally 
does not substitute for regular fixed pay. 
How can this be? How is it possible that employee ownership can 
simply add to, rather than substitute for, other forms of pay or wealth? 
One interpretation that integrates the accumulated evidence about 
worker behavior, productivity, and pay levels is based on theories of 
reciprocity and gift exchange. The idea that reciprocity is important in 
economic and social relationships receives strong support from labora-
tory and field studies (Axelrod 1984; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Gintis et 
al. 2005). This idea has been formalized in the efficiency wage model 
of “gift exchange,” in which workers respond to the “gift” of above-
market compensation with a reciprocal “gift” of high effort and coop-
eration to benefit the firm and fellow workers (Akerlof 1982). There 
has been substantial empirical evidence in support of efficiency wage 
models of the labor market (as shown by the meta-analysis in Peach and 
Stanley [2009]). Giving employees the opportunity to own stock on top 
of regular compensation may be an especially effective “gift” for creat-
ing and reinforcing a sense of common purpose and encouraging higher 
commitment and productivity (Blasi et al. 2010). This is consistent with 
the studies finding higher average productivity under employee owner-
ship, summarized above. Recent evidence lends further support to this 
interpretation, finding that positive effects of employee ownership on 
attitudes and behaviors are much more likely to occur when employee 
ownership comes on top of market-level wages and benefits (Weltmann, 
Blasi, and Kruse 2015). 
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The consistent finding that employee ownership tends to be “gravy” 
on top of other pay and wealth means that it may be a promising means 
for increasing worker incomes and wealth in general, which may help 
to reduce inequality. A 1986 General Accounting Office (GAO) report 
concludes that “the distribution of stock ownership within ESOPs 
appears to be broader than is the case in the population at large,” but 
that there were too few ESOP participants for this to make a noticeable 
difference in the overall distribution of stock ownership or wealth in 
general during this time—a time when ESOPs had just begun (USGAO 
1986, p. 43). The first GAO conclusion is supported by more recent 
data, which finds that the distribution of wealth among employees in 
employee ownership companies is more equal than among all employ-
ees or households in general (Buchele et al. 2010). These results sug-
gest that expansion of employee ownership has potential for enhancing 
the broad-based sharing of economic prosperity. 
Lower labor-management conflict and higher quality of work 
life. Employee ownership may help to create a harmonious workplace, 
with workers having a greater say in decisions and other improvements 
in their workplace experiences. 
Does employee ownership in fact create more harmonious work-
places? One study found that strikes were less common in unionized 
companies that adopted ESOPs (Cramton, Mehran, and Tracy 2008), 
which may reflect the greater financial transparency of unionized ESOP
companies (Bova, Dou, and Hope 2015). Employees tend to give com-
panies higher ratings on management-employee relations and other 
aspects of company treatment of employees (e.g., handling of promo-
tions, worker safety, and trustworthiness) when they are employee own-
ers or otherwise participate in shared rewards (Kruse, Freeman, and 
Blasi 2010). 
Two basic measures of the quality of work life are workers’ turn-
over intentions and workers’ job satisfaction. The GSS data in Figure 
1.5 show the relationship between workers’ turnover intentions and 
ownership. In each year, workers with employee ownership indicated 
a lower level of intention to find a new job than workers who did not 
participate in employee ownership; for example, in 2002, nearly 23 per-
cent of nonemployee owners indicated a high likelihood of turnover 
intention, compared to 13 percent of employee owners. This difference 
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Employee owner Not employee owner 
2002 2006 2010 2014 
NOTE: Turnover intention information is based on the GSS variable trynewjb, which 
asks the respondent how likely he or she is to make a genuine effort to find a new job 
with another employer within the coming year. The response “very likely” was coded 
as high turnover intention, while responses “somewhat likely” and “not at all likely” 
were coded as low turnover intention. Figure illustrates mean response by employee 
ownership. 
SOURCE: Data are from the GSS on employees at private firms. 
is maintained over time, although the gap narrows in 2014. A more 
detailed analysis of the turnover data shows that employees who are 
owners are less likely than other employees to say they will look for a 
new job, after controlling for detailed job and personal characteristics 
(Blasi et al. 2010). In addition, a recent analysis of the “Great Place 
to Work” data set—which includes more than 700 firms and 230,000 
workers—shows that worker intent to stay with the company is signifi-
cantly higher in ESOP companies than in non-ESOP companies (Blasi, 
Freeman, and Kruse 2016). 
The relation of employee ownership to the other basic measure of 
the quality of work life—job satisfaction—is illustrated in Figure 1.6. 
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Not employee owner 
2002 2006 2010 2014 
NOTE: Data are based on the GSS variable satjob1, which asks how satisfied employ-
ees are with their jobs on a scale of 1 (“not at all”) to 4 (“very”). The figure illustrates 
mean job satisfaction by year. 
SOURCE: Data are from the GSS on employees at private firms. 
related in the 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 waves of the GSS. The dif-
ference between employee owners and non–employee owners is very 
small, however, in 2010 and 2014, which could reflect low stock values 
and uncertainty following the Great Recession. 
Further probing of the job satisfaction and turnover intention results 
shows that any favorable effects of employee ownership appear to be 
very dependent on the presence of other supportive workplace policies. 
An index combining employee ownership and stock options with other 
shared rewards (profit sharing and gainsharing) was found to predict 
higher job satisfaction and lower turnover intentions only when com-
bined with high-performance work policies (employee involvement, 
training, and job security) and low levels of supervision; without such 
policies, the effect on job satisfaction was in fact negative (Blasi et al. 
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This latter result may reflect mixed messages to employees when 
they are given employee ownership or stock options without supportive 
workplace policies: “We want you to be more productive as employee-
owners, but we’re not going to give you the tools to be more productive, 
and we’re going to keep a close eye on you” (Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi 
2010, pp. 274–275). In such cases, employee ownership may be seen 
primarily as an attempt to shift financial risk onto workers, rather than 
to empower workers. 
Therefore, an important question is whether employee ownership 
is generally accompanied by supportive workplace policies. The GSS 
data show that employee financial participation goes hand in hand with 
workplace practices that empower workers with the ability to improve 
workplace performance (and thereby increase their payoff from having 
a share in company ownership), particularly employee involvement in 
decision making and firm-sponsored employee training. One of the 2006 
GSS survey questions asks the following: “Some companies have orga-
nized workplace decision-making in ways to get more employee input 
and involvement. Are you personally involved in any group, team, com-
mittee, or task force that addresses issues such as product quality, cost 
cutting, productivity, health and safety, or another workplace issue?” 
Forty-three percent of employee owners responded affirmatively to this 
question in 2006, and 34 percent did so in 2014, compared to only 28 
percent and 29 percent in those two years among nonowners, as seen in 
Figure 1.7. A similar relationship exists with respect to firm-sponsored 
employee training. As seen in Figure 1.8, nearly 65 percent of employee 
owners in 2006 reported that they had received formal training from 
their current employers in the past year, and 69 percent did so in 2014, 
compared to only 44 percent and 42 percent of nonowners in those two 
years. These relationships are strongly maintained when controlling for 
other job and personal characteristics (Bryson and Freeman 2010; Dube 
and Freeman 2010; Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi 2010). 
The higher prevalence of participation in decision making and 
training among employee owners suggests that there are complemen-
tarities of these policies with financial participation. Most basically, this 
points to the importance of providing employee owners with the means
to improve performance—through increased skills and opportunities 
for input—so that they can effectively take action in response to the 
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Employee owner Not employee owner 
2006 2014 
NOTE: Data are based on the GSS variable empinput, which asks, “Some companies 
have organized workplace decision-making in ways to get more employee input and 
involvement. Are you personally involved in any group, team, committee, or task 
force that addresses issues such as product quality, cost cutting, productivity, health 
and safety, or another workplace issue?” The figure illustrates the share of employees 
who responded affirmatively to this question. 
SOURCE: Data are from the GSS on employees at private firms. 
should be combined with “residual returns” in order to provide proper 
incentives. As noted earlier, prior evidence has supported the idea that 
employee involvement, training, and job security combine with shared 
rewards in improving performance-related attitudes and behaviors. 
In summary of the literature on labor-management conflict and 
quality of work life, the above results—plus other studies reviewed in 
Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi (2010)—indicate that employee ownership 
is linked to the following results: 
• fewer strikes and better evaluations of workplace relations 
• lower turnover and higher job satisfaction, but only when shared 
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Employee owner Not employee owner 
2006 2014 
NOTE: Data are based on the GSS variable emptrain, which asks, “In the last 12 
months, have you received any formal training from your current employer, such as 
in classes or seminars sponsored by the employer?” The figure illustrates the share of 
employees who responded affirmatively to this question. 
SOURCE: Data are from the GSS on employees at private firms. 
• greater employee participation in decisions 
• higher likelihood of company-sponsored training 
• higher levels of pay 
• higher job security 
Free rider problem. Group incentives can clearly dilute the indi-
vidual incentive to work hard, and thereby they can hamper productiv-
ity gains from share plans. However, as discussed above in the review 
of evidence on economic performance, it does not appear to prevent 
employee ownership firms from having higher productivity on aver-
age. Game theory shows that the free rider problem (an example of the 
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which everyone can agree on and enforce high work norms (Axelrod 
1984; Fudenberg and Maskin 1986). Such cooperation may be created 
and maintained by policies that build team spirit, loyalty, and peer pres-
sure to perform well. This idea is supported by the finding that positive 
effects of group incentives on attitudes and behaviors are more likely 
to occur when employees are covered by high-performance work poli-
cies (employee involvement, training, and job security) and are given 
freedom to work without close supervision (Blasi et al. 2010). In addi-
tion, the finding that employee owners are more likely than nonowners 
to take action against shirking coworkers indicates that the free rider 
problem is often overcome by worker comonitoring and enforcement 
of higher norms. 
Financial risk. The financial risk that can result from tying worker 
pay and wealth to firm performance is an important concern. A funda-
mental premise of portfolio theory is that portfolios should be struc-
tured to balance risk and reward, and that diversification is important 
to mitigate risk. Having a large portion of one’s wealth portfolio in 
any one asset means that the portfolio may not be properly diversified, 
and a plunge in the value of that asset can cause a significant decline 
in the portfolio’s overall value. The financial risk may be greater with 
employer stock than with other assets, since if the company does poorly 
the worker could lose his or her job along with a decline in wealth, pos-
sibly endangering his or her retirement security. 
It is undoubtedly true that some workers have too much of their 
wealth tied up in a single asset and thus are not properly diversified. For 
example, each year many people use some or all of their life savings 
to start their own businesses. As with entrepreneurs who are heavily 
invested in their businesses, employee ownership may sometimes con-
tribute to improper diversification. The financial risk from employee 
ownership, however, does not appear to be a major problem in practice, 
as indicated by the following research findings: 
Employee ownership generally comes on top of standard pay 
and benefits. It is important to reemphasize that workers do not pay for 
stock with their wages or savings in ESOPs, the most prevalent form 
of employee ownership in the United States. As noted above in the dis-
cussion of broad-based prosperity, there is strong evidence that most 
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employee owners receive fixed pay and benefits that are at or above 
market level, and that firms do not lower base pay as they adopt ESOPs 
except in rare situations, when they may make a concession. Employer 
stock generally adds to, rather than substitutes for, other forms of wealth. 
This greatly mitigates any financial risk, since workers are not sacrific-
ing for risky pay—the employee ownership may be seen as “gravy” on 
top of regular pay, which appears to be crucial in improving employees’
performance-related attitudes and behaviors, as discussed above. 
Increased job security reduces financial risk. The biggest form of 
financial risk faced by most workers is job loss, as opposed to market 
fluctuations in the value of their financial assets. If employee ownership 
does contribute to employment stability and firm survival, as suggested 
by past studies and as explored in this book, employee owners may face 
less financial risk than other employees. 
Even risk-averse employees tend to like these plans. One sur-
prising finding from the NBER study of more than 40,000 employees 
is that two-thirds of the most risk-averse employees reported that they 
would like at least some ownership, profit sharing, or stock options in 
their pay package. For example, among those who rated themselves as 
3 or lower on a 0–10 scale of how much they like to take risks (with 
0 = “hating to take any kind of risk” and 10 = “loving to take risks”), 
66 percent said they would prefer to be paid at least in part with profit 
sharing, stock, or stock options as opposed to entirely with a fixed wage 
or salary. Also, 55 percent of this group wanted their next pay increase 
to be split between fixed wages and profit sharing, stock, or options, 
and 12 percent wanted it all to be in the form of profit sharing, stock, or 
options (Kruse, Blasi, and Park 2010). Risk aversion clearly influences 
attitudes toward variable pay, since the above figures were even higher 
among those who are less risk averse, but these results indicate that 
even risk-averse employees are open to employee ownership and other 
variable pay plans. 
Along with these empirical findings, researchers find the following: 
Recent theory shows that employee ownership can be part of an 
efficient diversified portfolio. Harry Markowitz, who won the Nobel 
Prize in economics for portfolio theory, explicitly rejects the idea that 
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risk aversion precludes employee ownership. His theory concludes that 
substantial amounts of a single asset—including stock in one’s com-
pany—can be part of an efficient portfolio as long as the overall portfo-
lio is properly diversified (Markowitz, Blasi, and Kruse 2010). 
In sum, employee ownership has been seen as relevant to economic 
performance, job security, macroeconomic stability, and economic 
inequality, with potential implications for firms, workers, the economy, 
and society as a whole. Prior studies provide evidence that it is often 
associated with better outcomes for firms and workers, and that the free 
rider and risk problems are important but may be overcome under the 
right circumstances. There is very little evidence, however, on how 
employee ownership relates to employment stability and firm survival, 
which is the focus of this book. We will spend the latter half of this book 
presenting new evidence on the link between employee ownership and 
employment stability and firm survival. However, before presenting our 
findings, it will be helpful to set the stage by first reviewing the history 
and current prevalence of employee ownership, which we turn to now 
in Chapter 2. 
Notes 
1. The Employee Ownership Foundation provided significant funding for the collec-
tion of data from the employee ownership module of the GSS. 
2. These methods include instrumental variables, two-stage least squares, and Heck-
man corrections. 
3. In one study, only 4 percent of ESOPs were adopted as part of wage and benefit 
concessions (USGAO 1986). Of the nearly 1,000 public companies that developed 
sizable employee ownership stakes in the 1980s, there were only 26 cases of trad-
ing stock for wages and 41 cases of terminating defined benefit plans (Blasi and 
Kruse 1991, pp. 325–328). 
 
2 
Prevalence of Employee Ownership 
This chapter sets the stage for the new evidence presented in the 
forthcoming chapters by providing background on the history and 
prevalence of employee ownership. In this chapter, we first review the 
historical roots of employee ownership in the United States. Employee 
ownership as we know it today takes various forms, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, such as Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and 
stock ownership in 401(k) pension plans. However, these tools are rel-
atively recent manifestations of the notion of broad-based sharing of 
company revenue with employees. The earliest manifestations of the 
idea of workers having an ownership stake in the firms where they work 
came during the era of the American Revolution, in the closely related 
notion of profit sharing.1 Therefore, a discussion of the historical roots 
of employee ownership in the United States necessarily involves the 
discussion of early implementation of profit sharing. We review the 
early history of profit sharing as envisioned by the founding fathers of 
the United States and implemented during that time, followed by its 
implementation by firms during the era of industrialization. We then go 
on to review more recent prevalence of employee ownership using evi-
dence from large data sets—namely, the General Social Survey and the 
U.S. Department of Labor Form 5500 files. We also present evidence 
on how the prevalence of employee ownership varies by firm industry, 
firm size, and worker occupation. Finally, we discuss the prevalence of 
employee ownership in countries other than the United States. 
HISTORICAL ROOTS OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Cod Fisheries and Whaling in New England 
The idea of workers having an ownership stake in the firms where 
they work has a long and rich history in the United States, and its roots 
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can be traced all the way back to the philosophies of the founding 
fathers of the republic. 
Cod fishing and whaling were among the most important industries 
in New England during the early years of the nation. Throughout the 
1700s, seamen on cod and whaling ships very commonly had a stake 
in the overall profit their ship made. Crews shared the rewards of suc-
cessful hauls, including the lowest-level members of the crew, and were 
called “sharesmen.” Some fishermen even had ownership shares in the 
ship, which made them investors in the business as well as recipients of 
the profit shares as workers. 
George Washington’s Treasury secretary, Alexander Hamilton, was 
a proponent of such share schemes and advanced a bill that strengthened 
this practice, which Congress passed in 1792 and President Washington 
signed into law. The U.S. government wanted to rebuild the cod fish-
ing fleet, which had essentially served as the navy and was decimated 
by the British in the Revolutionary War. Building on the sharing tra-
dition in the industry, the law mandated tax credits to cod fisheries, 
which would be divided among the vessel’s owners and the crew (three-
eighths to the owners and five-eighths to the crew), and the credit would 
be granted only if the shipowner had a written contract before the voy-
age that stipulated that the profit from the entire catch would be shared 
with all the sailors. The shipowner could collect the credit only if he 
could produce this agreement. The law stayed in force for many years. 
In 1803, President Jefferson’s secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, 
reported to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on how the 
legislation had helped to strengthen the cod fishing industry. Gallatin 
was a strong proponent of broad-based sharing, elsewhere saying that 
“the democratic principle upon which this Nation was founded should 
not be restricted to the political processes but should be applied to the 
industrial operation” (U.S. Senate 1939, p. 72). The cod fishery law 
continued well into the nineteenth century. The federal government’s 
requirement that the cod fishery tax subsidy law be shared among the 
crew is the first documented case in American history where the govern-
ment made citizen shares a condition for receiving a tax break (Blasi, 
Freeman, and Kruse 2013). 
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Broad-Based Sharing in the 1800s and Early 1900s 
During the late 1800s, the nation’s leading industrialists, such 
as Charles Pillsbury, Andrew Carnegie, and John D. Rockefeller, 
embraced the notion of employee ownership and profit sharing and 
actively implemented broad-based shared capitalism programs in their 
companies.2 Many of these companies succeeded in meeting the market
test of surviving in a competitive economy and are still successful to 
this day. In 1882, Charles Pillsbury, whose company was the largest 
grain miller in the world at the time, instituted one of the first large-
scale employee profit-sharing schemes in the United States. He firmly 
believed that profit sharing was an effective tool to motivate workers, 
leading coworkers to be more responsible and practice effective self-
management. Early examples also include the personal care company 
Procter and Gamble introducing broad-based employee profit sharing 
in 1887 and employee ownership some years later, and George East-
man of Eastman Kodak introducing broad-based profit sharing in 1912, 
followed by a form of employee ownership similar to stock options. In 
order to retain the kind of workers on which Kodak’s rapid innovation 
and growth relied, he created what was the first stock option program 
in a high-tech corporation in the United States: if workers stayed with 
the company, they could keep their company shares, and they could 
purchase additional shares for $100 each and cash them in for almost 
$600 each. 
Current Examples 
Today, there are countless examples of extremely successful com-
panies, across all sectors of the U.S. economy, that implement employee 
financial participation programs, including many of the nation’s largest 
companies, such as General Motors, Exxon Mobil, IBM, Ford Motor 
Company, Apple Computers, Microsoft, Intel, Johnson and Johnson, 
United Parcel Service, Amazon, Coca-Cola, Cisco Systems, Google, 
and Morgan Stanley. 
To focus on a few of these examples, the oil and energy company 
Exxon Mobil, the United States’s largest corporation, has had broad-
based employee ownership plans since John D. Rockefeller established 
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Standard Oil in 1919. General Motors, the country’s fifth-largest cor-
poration, which was bailed out and restructured, has cash profit sharing 
and broad-based stock options, while the health plan for its unionized 
workers and retirees encompasses a significant chunk of the company’s 
stock. Ford Motor Company, the country’s ninth-largest corporation, 
has an employee stock ownership plan and a deferred profit-sharing 
plan for its salaried and hourly employees, along with cash profit shar-
ing, and the employees own over 13 percent of the company. Johnson 
and Johnson, the country’s forty-second-largest corporation, has a long 
history of offering employees financial participation in the company as 
a result of the writings of Robert Wood Johnson II early in the twentieth 
century, and it has a significant employee stock ownership plan. 
Broad-based employee financial participation is especially popular 
in the technology sector. Microsoft, a leader in software and the Inter-
net, beginning in 1986 pioneered broad-based employee ownership in 
the software industry, and it has continually updated these benefits. It 
was ranked number 76 on Fortune magazine’s “100 Best Companies to 
Work For” list in 2012. Apple Computers, the country’s seventeenth-
largest corporation, has a generous employee stock purchase plan that 
allows employees to buy up to $25,000 of the stock annually at a 15 
percent discount; Apple employees who bought stock for the past seven 
years realized a reported 869 percent return on their investment. The 
computer chip company Intel, which was one of the pioneers in terms 
of offering broad-based employee ownership and having profit sharing 
in Silicon Valley, received the Global Equity Organization Award, both 
for its financial education of workers and for having the most effective 
ownership plan. At Google, all employees are equity holders; the com-
pany is about 5 percent owned by its nonexecutive employees and has 
reserved almost 5 percent of its shares for future stock and stock-option 
grants for its workforce. In 2012, Google won first place in Fortune
magazine’s “100 Best Companies to Work For” list, in part for its com-
mitment to broad-based employee ownership. 
The evidence is not limited to these firms. About 10 to 20 percent 
of the 4,500 corporations whose stock is traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange and the NASDAQ exchange have meaningful employee 
ownership. Among the Fortune 100, 21 companies have broad-based 
share ownership as part of their business cultures. These include firms in 
technology, finance, transportation, energy, retail, and consumer prod-
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ucts. About 10 percent of companies in the Fortune 500 have employee 
stock ownership of between 5 and 20 percent. Some have employee 
stock purchase plans that allow workers to buy stock at a discount; oth-
ers have lower-risk employee stock ownership plans that finance the 
purchase of stock for workers through loans or company contributions 
and grant stock to workers for which the workers do not pay. Some-
times, ESOP stock matches employee contributions to 401(k) plans. 
Some plans allow workers to use their wages to buy stock in 401(k) 
plans. Others have stock options or plans that grant workers restricted 
stock that they receive as long as they stay with the company. 
Today, most full or majority employee ownership of a company 
is done through an ESOP. Workers receive grants of stock from their 
company that they do not have to purchase with savings or wages. Typi-
cally, the company sets up a trust that accumulates company stock for 
employees through company contributions or loans that the company 
takes out to buy the stock. A bank or other lender has to approve the 
loan, based on an evaluation of whether the company can pay it back. 
Because workers do not pay for the stock with their wages, this form 
of employee ownership has lower risk. Most ESOPs are not on stock 
exchanges, insulating them from the volatility of stock markets. 
CURRENT PREVALENCE OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Evidence from the GSS 
What is the prevalence of employee ownership in the United States 
today? How many workers share in the profits generated by corpora-
tions by having an ownership stake in the company where they work? 
What proportion of their companies do workers typically own? 
It has been difficult to find comprehensive answers to these ques-
tions because of the dearth of data pertinent to employee ownership. 
National surveys did not include questions on this topic until, in 2002, 
a major effort by employee ownership researchers led to the inclusion 
of a set of questions on this topic in the General Social Survey (GSS). 
As noted in Chapter 1, the GSS, which is conducted by the National 
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Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, collects nation-
ally representative data for the United States and therefore allows us to 
glean knowledge that is descriptive of the U.S. population as a whole.3 
The GSS began including the Topical Module on Shared Capitalism, 
with questions on the prevalence of employee ownership, in 2002. 
Since then, this module has been included in the GSS every four years: 
in 2006, 2010, and 2014. 
As part of the Shared Capitalism Module, the GSS asks all workers 
if they are eligible for profit sharing (defined as bonuses that are affected 
by company performance), and asks private-sector workers about their 
ownership of employer stock (either directly or through a pension plan) 
and whether they hold stock options. As described in Chapter 1, there 
are several ways in which U.S. employees can get an ownership stake in 
the companies where they work, including grants to an ESOP, restricted 
stock grants, stock matches to employee 401(k) contributions, alloca-
tion of employer contributions to stock in deferred profit-sharing and 
other pension plans, and employee purchases of stock through 401(k) 
plans, employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs), or the open market. 
Employees may also acquire an ownership stake in the companies 
where they work through stock options, which give them the right to 
purchase stock at a predetermined set price (strike price) regardless of 
the market price of the stock. So if the market price of the company’s 
stock goes above the strike price, the owner of the stock can choose to 
exercise the stock option—i.e., exercise her right to buy at the exer-
cise price and immediately sell at the market price, thereby making a 
profit. And if the stock price falls below the market price, the owner of 
the stock option can hold off on exercising the option so as not to lose 
money until the market price rises above the strike price. However, an 
important point is that stock-option holdings of employees can only be 
considered employee ownership if and when they are exercised. Thus, 
stock options could lead to employee ownership, but they do not strictly 
constitute employee ownership in and of themselves. Therefore, when 
we present descriptive statistics or figures on employee stock-option 
holdings, we will treat them as distinct from employee ownership. 
Table 2.1 presents evidence on the prevalence of employee owner-
ship in the United States since 2002 from the General Social Survey. 
According to the most recent GSS wave, which includes the shared 
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Table 2.1  Participation in Employee Ownership and Stock Options, 
2002–2014 
2002 2006 2010 2014 
All private sector 
% of employees covered 
Own company stock 20.1 17.1 17.8 19.5 
Hold stock options 12.3 9.1 9.0 7.2 
Number of employees covered (millions) 
Total employees in economya 109.0 114.5 107.7 117.3 
Own company stock 21.9 19.6 19.2 22.9 
Hold stock options 13.4 10.4 9.7 8.5 
Sample sizes 1,261 1,172 795 885 
a The figure for total private-sector employees comes from Bureau of Labor Statistics 
establishment data for July of the given year.
SOURCE: Based on the authors’ analysis of the General Social Survey (GSS). Data 
come from the Shared Capitalism Module of the GSS, administered by the National 
Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. 
firms in the United States participated in employee ownership through 
ownership of company stock, and 7.2 percent participated through own-
ership of company stock options (column 4). This amounts to 22.9 mil-
lion employees with stock and 8.5 million with stock options, out of a 
total of 117.3 million employees in the private sector. 
TRENDS IN THE PREVALENCE OF
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 
Evidence from GSS 
How have these figures been evolving during the past decade, 
which includes the Great Recession? GSS data on employee ownership 
have been collected since 2002, which gives us some idea about the 
evolution of employee ownership in the past 15 years. As can be seen in 
Table 2.1, the prevalence of employee stock ownership was greatest in 
2002, declined in 2006, increased slightly in 2010, and increased again 
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percent) owned company stock, and that fraction fell to just over one-
sixth of employees in 2006 (17.1 percent) and 2010 (17.8 percent), but 
then rose back to almost one-fifth of employees in 2014 (19.5 percent). 
The trend for stock options, however, has been consistently downward, 
from 12.3 percent of employees holding stock options in 2002 to 7.2 
percent doing so in 2014. This latter trend largely reflects the scaling 
back of broad-based stock options after the requirement for expensing 
of stock options took effect starting in 2005 (Blasi, Freeman, and Kruse 
2013). 
Evidence from Pension Reports 
We can also glean valuable information about the prevalence and 
evolution of employee ownership in the United States from the U.S. 
Department of Labor’s Form 5500 firm pension records, which include 
all employee ownership held through ESOPs, 401(k) plans, deferred 
profit-sharing plans, and other defined contribution plans. As seen in 
Table 2.2, based on the Form 5500 data over time, the number of ESOP
participants grew from 7.6 million in 1999 to 10.6 million in 2012, 
while the number of participants in 401(k) plans that hold employer 
stock declined from 7.3 million to 5.7 million, and the number in 
other defined contribution plans that hold employer stock declined 
from 0.6 to 0.2 million. The decline in participants in non-ESOP plans 
with employer stock reflects the scaling back of employee ownership 
through 401(k) plans following the Enron failure, in which workers 
used their own savings to overinvest in company stock. The total num-
ber of participants, including both ESOPs and non-ESOPs, nonethe-
less grew over this period from 15.6 million to 16.5 million. Employee 
ownership grew not just in number of participants but in coverage of 
the private-sector workforce. Using lower-bound estimates that count 
only the largest plan in each company (to eliminate any double counting 
of employees in more than one plan), the percentage of private-sector 
employees in pension plans with employer stock grew from 11.9 per-
cent in 1999 to 14.9 percent in 2006, falling slightly to 14.4 percent in 
2010 and 13.6 percent in 2012. 
Much of the growth in ESOPs over this period has taken place in 
S corporations. In S corporations, corporate income or loss is passed 
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Table 2.2  Employee Ownership through Pension Plans, 1999–2012 
1999 2002 2006 2010 2012 
Number of participants 
ESOPs 7,653,578 9,204,622 9,786,398 10,289,126 10,553,875 
Non-ESOP 401(k) plan with employer stock 7,332,699 8,722,121 8,613,102 6,418,207 5,744,207 
Other DC plan with employer stock 572,582 589,152 265,189 209,788 183,853 
Total 15,558,859 18,515,895 18,664,689 16,917,121 16,481,935 
Number of employees (lower bound)a 
ESOPs 6,880,734 8,529,702 9,132,348 9,497,685 9,855,628 
Non-ESOP 401(k) plan with employer stock 6,850,212 8,349,747 8,182,402 6,243,223 5,637,659 
Other DC plan with employer stock 433,470 452,121 218,356 184,727 161,753 
Total 13,104,578 16,150,879 17,195,112 15,599,622 15,396,508 
% of private-sector workforceb 
ESOPs 6.2 7.8 7.9 8.8 8.7 
Non-ESOP 401(k) plan with employer stock 6.2 7.7 7.1 5.8 5.0 
Other DC plan with employer stock 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Total 11.9 14.8 14.9 14.4 13.6 
a Figures reflect only largest plan within company, eliminating any double counting of participants in more than one plan.
b Based on total private employment for December of given year, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website, bls.gov.
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gains or losses (per Subchapter S of Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue 
Code). A separate analysis of Form 5500 data finds that the number of 
ESOP participants in S corporations more than doubled, from 193,746 
to 459,878, over the 2002–2009 period (Brill 2012), which represents 
more than half of the total growth in ESOP participants over this period. 
This growth occurred despite the fact that retiring owners in S Corpo-
rations are not currently eligible to avoid capital gains by selling to 
an ESOP (although there is currently a bipartisan bill in Congress to 
extend this tax benefit to S corporations). 
Table 2.3 focuses on employee ownership in publicly traded U.S. 
firms with deferred employee ownership plans, using the core data on 
which the empirical analyses in Chapters 3 through 5 are based. The 
Table 2.3  Employee Ownership in Pension Plans in Publicly Held 
Companies, 1999–2011 
1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 
Share of firms reporting any EO
stock in pension plans (%) 











participating in EO in pension 
plans, on average (%) 
Sample size 9,907 8,533 7,804 6,900 5,980 
SOURCE: Data are from the USDOL Form 5500 pension database, matched to Stan-
dard and Poor’s Compustat data on publicly traded companies in the United States. 
percentage of publicly traded firms with deferred employee ownership 
plans grew from 16.8 percent in 1999 to 19.9 percent in 2002, then 
declined slightly to 19.0 percent in 2006 and 17.5 percent in 2010. Fur-
thermore, the share of workers participating in employee ownership in 
pension plans at the typical firm grew from 11.0 percent in 1999 to 14.6 
percent in 2002, then declined slightly to 13.6 percent in 2006 and to 
12.6 percent in 2010. It is noteworthy that the levels of coverage are 
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Does the Prevalence of Employee Ownership at Firms Vary 
by Company Characteristics Like Industry, Size, and Worker
Occupation? 
Many people think that employee ownership is 1) held mainly by 
managerial workers, 2) used mainly in large firms, and 3) concentrated 
in the high-tech computer industry. While there is some validity in these 
generalizations, they fail to capture the broad prevalence of employee 
ownership in the U.S. economy. In fact, employee ownership is preva-
lent in many different industries and occupations, and it spans firms of 
all sizes. We can glean information about the firm size, industry, and 
occupation distribution of employee ownership from the GSS. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the share of workers who own stock in their 
company within specific industries, using combined data from the 2002, 
2006, 2010, and 2014 waves of the GSS. As we can see, there is sub-
stantial participation in employee stock ownership among workers in 
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most industries. The communications and information industry has the 
highest prevalence of employee ownership, with over 45 percent of 
workers in that industry participating in employee ownership of stock. 
The finance, insurance, and real estate industry and the transportation 
and utilities industry have the next highest prevalence with 31 percent, 
closely followed by durable manufacturing with 29 percent and non-
durable manufacturing with 28 percent of their workers participating 
in employee ownership of stock. Even apart from the leading indus-
tries, there is substantial employee ownership of stock across most other 
industries: wholesale trade has 17 percent; retail trade has 16 percent; 
professional and business services has 14 percent; agriculture, mining, 
and construction has 11 percent; and the two lowest industries are educa-
tion and health services with 8 percent and other services with 7 percent. 
Figure 2.2 analogously illustrates the share of workers who own 
stock options within industries. We see similar patterns here, though 
at lower levels generally. The communications and information indus-


































SOURCE: Based on combined data from the 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 GSS. 
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try is the clear leader with 40 percent of its employees holding stock 
options, and the lowest prevalence is among education and health ser-
vices (2 percent) and other services (3 percent). 
We next turn to an analysis of prevalence of employee ownership 
within occupations, again using combined data over the 2002–2014 
waves. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show that employee stock and stock option 
holdings are common across all occupations. As seen in Figure 2.3, 


































Managerial Management Professional/ Sales Clerical Service Blue-collar/ 
related technical agriculture 
NOTE: Managerial jobs include executives, legislators, administrators, and managers. 
Management-related jobs include accountants and auditors, underwriters, financial 
officers, management analysts, and personnel and labor specialists. Professional jobs 
include architects, engineers, mathematicians and statisticians, scientists, doctors and 
dentists, registered nurses, teachers, and lawyers. Technical jobs include laboratory 
technicians, dental hygienists, electrical technicians, and mechanical technicians. 
Sales jobs include sales workers, advertising sales workers, and cashiers. Clerical 
jobs include secretaries, stenographers, typists, administrative support jobs, telephone 
operators, and receptionists. Service jobs include firefighters, police, waiters, clean-
ers, cooks, and child-care workers. Agriculture jobs include farm operators and man-
agers, farm workers, sea captains, and fishers. Blue-collar jobs include mechanics, 
equipment repairers, locksmiths, construction supervisors and workers, tailors, bak-
ers, plant and machine operators, and bus and taxi drivers. 
SOURCE: Based on combined data from the 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 GSS. 
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management-related occupations and managerial occupations had the 
greatest salience of employee stock ownership. Specifically, over 28 
percent of workers in management-related occupations (which include 
accountants and auditors, financial officers, and management analysts, 
among others) had employee stock ownership. This figure was around 
26 percent for managerial occupations (executives, managers, etc.), 
24 percent for clerical occupations (secretaries, administrative support 
jobs, telephone operators, receptionists, etc.), 20 percent for sales occu-
pations (sales workers, cashiers, etc.), and 19 percent for professional 
and technical occupations (engineers, architects, doctors, lawyers, labo-
ratory technicians, electrical and mechanical technicians, etc.). Further-
more, blue-collar and agriculture occupations each had 17 percent of 
workers who were employee stock owners, and service occupations had 
7 percent. Figure 2.4 illustrates stock option holdings within occupa-
tions, showing that the greatest concentration of stock option holdings 
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NOTE: See note for Figure 2.3. 
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is in management-related occupations (16 percent), followed by clerical 
occupations (15 percent) and managerial occupations (13 percent). 
Finally, let us turn to an examination of employee ownership by 
firm size. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate that employee stock ownership 
is by no means only a large-firm phenomenon. While it is true that large 
firms have a greater share of workers who own stock and stock options 
in their company, there is substantial ownership at firms of all sizes. As 
seen in Figure 2.5, nearly 6 percent of workers owned stock at their firm 
in companies that number fewer than 10 employees in size, and 10 per-
cent in companies that have 10–99 employees. This figure was nearly 
19 percent at firms with 100–999 employees, nearly 24 percent at firms 
with 1,000–9,999 employees, and about 40 percent at firms with more 
than 10,000 employees. As for stock option holdings, Figure 2.6 shows 
that the share of workers holding stock options in their company was 
about 2 percent at firms with fewer than 10 employees, 4 percent at 
firms with 10–99 employees, 7 percent at firms with 100–999 employ-
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SOURCE: Based on combined data from the 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 GSS. 
ees, 13 percent at firms with 1,000–9,999 employees, and 21 percent at 
firms with more than 10,000 employees. 
Prevalence of Employee Ownership Abroad 
Employee ownership is a common practice not only in the United 
States but also abroad. A study of Canadian and Australian firms (Long 
and Shields 2005) reports that 21 percent of firms in each of those coun-
tries use employee stock purchase plans, and 10 percent of firms in 
Canada and 3 percent of firms in Australia use employee stock options. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the European Union encouraged employee 
ownership in its four reports from 1991 to 2008 known as the PEP-
PER (Promotion of Employee Participation in Profits and Enterprise 
Results) Reports and called on member states to promote participa-
tion by employed persons in profits and enterprise performance. A
2013 study gives an overview of employee ownership in 27 European 
Union Countries (Hashi and Hashani 2013). Using data from the Euro-
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pean Company Survey and the European Working Conditions Survey, 
the authors show that the average proportion of companies offering 
employee share ownership in Europe in 2009 was around 6.5 percent. 
This is likely to be an understatement, because these surveys focus on 
small and medium-sized firms, and employee ownership tends to be 
more prevalent in large firms. The countries with the greatest preva-
lence of employee ownership are France, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Romania, and the financial sec-
tor tends to be the industry with the highest prevalence across coun-
tries. Additionally, the proportion of employees involved in employee 
ownership has been growing during the 2000s in almost all countries 
in the EU. For example, the proportion of employees participating in 
employee ownership programs in France grew from around 3 percent 
in 2000 to around 7 percent in 2005 and 2010. 
Data for the United Kingdom from the Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey’s 2004 wave indicate that around 20 percent of Brit-
ish workplaces and 32 percent of British employees had some form 
of employee ownership scheme, which is comparable to rates in the 
United States (Bryson and Freeman 2010). There are various employee 
ownership structures in the United Kingdom that are different from 
those in the United States. For example, the United Kingdom has Save 
As You Earn (SAYE) Plans, which are all-employee plans that give 
workers tax breaks when they save to purchase their employer’s shares 
but that do not require that they purchase the shares; Share Incentive 
Plans (SIP), which are all-employee schemes that offer tax breaks for 
employees holding shares in the company for which they work; and 
Company Share Option Plans (CSOPs), in which companies can grant 
chosen employees or directors up to 30,000 British pounds of tax- and 
national insurance–advantaged share options. The majority of the stock 
ownership plans are open to all nonmanagerial employees because the 
UK tax code usually requires this as a condition to be able to obtain 
tax breaks. The prevalence of share ownership in the United Kingdom 
has grown over time, partly reflecting the fact that the UK government 
has encouraged broad-based share ownership schemes through favor-
able tax treatment, especially in the 1980s, when many government tax 
incentives were introduced. In that decade, the conservative government 
of Margaret Thatcher gave tax advantages for profit-related pay. Since 





44 Kurtulus and Kruse 
to share ownership schemes at the expense of profit-related schemes, 
which became fully taxable. Unlike the United States, which gives tax 
breaks for collective ownership of shares through ESOPs, the United 
Kingdom gives breaks for individual share ownership. Pendleton,
Whitfield, and Bryson (2009) show that the proportion of private-sector 
UK workplaces with broad-based shared ownership grew from 20 per-
cent in 1984 to 28 percent in 2004. 
There is wide variation in the structures and incidence of employee 
share ownership in other industrialized countries (Kaarsemaker, 
Pendleton, and Poutsma 2010). Among European countries other than 
the United Kingdom, France has the highest incidence, with a well-
developed employee savings system that allows employees to contrib-
ute bonuses and savings into employer stock (Fakhfakh, Pérotin, and 
Gago 2012). Relatedly, France also has substantial profit sharing as a 
result of government tax advantages offered to firms and employees for 
participation in profit sharing; one profit-sharing scheme is even com-
pulsory in France for all firms with 50 employees or more (Pérotin and 
Robinson 2002). Germany has not traditionally promoted employee 
share ownership, and the incidence of employee share ownership is not 
as high as in the United States, the United Kingdom, or France, partly 
because of the prevalence of very large private companies, in which 
ownership is frequently dominated by large—and often hidden—own-
ers. In Western Europe, the countries with the lowest use of employee 
share ownership have typically been the Mediterranean countries 
(Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), though Spain and Italy have impor-
tant representation in majority-worker-owned firms and worker coop-
eratives (Arando et al. 2015). 
Russia and Eastern European countries have also had considerable 
employee ownership as a result of the transition from Soviet-style econ-
omies (Mygind et al. 2006). After an initial surge of interest and policies 
promoting employee ownership in Russia following the breakup of the 
Soviet Union (Blasi, Kroumova, and Kruse 1997), the Russian econ-
omy has returned to concentrated ownership (Kachalina 2013). Dur-
ing the 1990s in Eastern Europe, privatization of many enterprises that 
were formerly government owned often involved distributing shares 
at discounted prices to employees (Earle and Estrin 1998; Pérotin and 
Robinson 2002), and in some cases employees had priority rights to 
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also have considerable concentrations of employee share ownership 
(Burdin 2014). 
As described in Chapter 1, employee ownership has been shown 
to have positive effects on employee performance, job satisfaction, 
morale, and workplace cooperation, among other outcomes. So, one 
might ask, why then isn’t employee ownership more prevalent in the 
United States as well as globally?4 One possibility is that many firms 
are simply not aware of the benefits, which would be understandable, 
given that the positive evidence has mostly accumulated only in the 
past two decades. An important complementary point is that while the 
evidence on economic performance is generally positive, it is also clear 
that there is no automatic positive effect of employee ownership, and 
many firms with employee ownership do not do well. Without a clear 
formula for success, firms will understandably be reluctant to adopt an 
organizational innovation like employee ownership, particularly when 
there may be significant fixed costs as well as a risk of raising employee 
expectations for changes in the way the company will operate and deci-
sions will be made. 
Firms will be especially reluctant to provide expanded ownership to 
employees if doing so dilutes the ownership stakes of existing owners— 
the dilution will need to be counteracted by improved performance, if 
existing owners are to have an incentive to distribute ownership more 
broadly. Existing owners may also be concerned about spreading finan-
cial information about the firm more broadly, since such information 
could fall into the hands of competitors. Finally, employee ownership 
may not be appropriate for all firms and workers, particularly those in 
volatile industries. Nevertheless, the growth in employee ownership in 
many countries indicates that the potential benefits may be increasingly 
recognized and may outweigh the barriers mentioned above. 
Apart from reluctance by firms to adopt employee ownership, 
unions have often been opposed to employee ownership, in part because 
of the concern that it will complicate collective bargaining by blurring 
the line between workers and owners. Unions have also been concerned 
about financial risks to workers from variable pay and wealth, and about 
management’s willingness to provide transparent, accurate information 
about the financial status of the company. Some unions, however, have 
taken initiatives to pursue employee ownership for workers out of a 
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role in workplace governance.5 The positive effects of employee own-
ership and other shared rewards on employee attitudes and behaviors 
appear to be just as strong among union workers as among nonunion 
workers (McCarthy et al. 2011). 
In sum, there has been a substantial amount of experimentation with 
employee ownership around the globe in the past several decades. This 
chapter has also demonstrated that broad-based employee ownership 
is prevalent not just in a handful of firms, sectors, or occupations, but 
is an economy-wide phenomenon in the United States and has a long 
and rich history, with roots in the philosophies of America’s founding 
fathers. Given this background, we are now ready to present in the next 
three chapters our results on the role played by employee ownership in 
employment stability and firm survival in the United States during the 
decade encompassing the Great Recession. 
Notes 
1. Indeed, the value of a firm’s stock represents the present discounted value of its 
profits. Therefore, by owning firm stock, an employee has a claim to a share of 
those profits. 
2. This section draws on material presented in Blasi, Freeman, and Kruse (2013). 
3. The GSS is based on face-to-face interviews of randomly selected adults in their 
homes. Face-to-face interviews are generally superior to mail surveys, computer-
assisted surveys, and telephone surveys in terms of accuracy. Moreover, the 
interviewer can ask more detailed questions than is possible under other survey 
methods, and the respondent can refer to personal records to answer questions 
more precisely. While response rates have been declining for telephone and mail 
surveys in recent years, the General Social Survey gets responses from more than 
70 percent of the people who are asked to participate in the survey, which is very 
high in comparison to other surveys. 
4. For a discussion of the specific barriers facing worker cooperatives, see Olsen 
(2013). 
5. For a further description of the arguments and literature on this topic, and new 
evidence on the effects of employee ownership, profit sharing, and stock options 
for union workers, see McCarthy et al. (2011). 
 
3 
How Does Employee Ownership 
Affect Employment Stability? 
Understanding the determinants of employment stability during 
economic downturns is a topic of keen interest to academic research-
ers, government policymakers, and firms. In this chapter, we examine 
whether broad-based employee ownership affects employment stability 
within firms. 
As described in Chapter 2, the prevalence of employee ownership 
has been growing over the past several decades in the United States and 
other advanced economies. According to the 2014 wave of the Gen-
eral Social Survey (GSS), 19.5 percent of U.S. workers own company 
stock, and 7.2 percent own company stock options. And according to 
data from the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) Form 5500 firm 
pension records, between 1999 and 2010 the share of publicly traded 
U.S. firms with employee ownership plans grew from 16.8 percent to 
17.5 percent, and the share of workers participating in employee own-
ership at the typical such firm rose from 11.0 percent to 12.6 percent, 
on average. Given the increasing prevalence of employee ownership, 
along with the high economic and social costs that can accompany job 
loss, understanding the relationship between employee ownership and 
employment stability carries great policy significance. 
Data from the GSS indicate that employee ownership and employ-
ment stability are positively correlated. As was shown in Chapter 1, 
involuntary layoffs and turnover intentions are lower among workers 
who are employee owners. Moreover, between 2006 and 2010, while 
the figures for EO workers remained relatively stable, layoffs and 
turnover intentions at non-EO firms grew. Put differently, layoffs and 
turnover became more likely among non-EO workers than among EO 
workers following the Great Recession. At the same time, job satisfac-
tion was higher among EO workers than among non-EO workers. 
In this chapter, we conduct an in-depth empirical analysis of how 
firms with employee ownership programs weathered the recessions of 
47 
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2001–2003 and 2008–2010 in terms of employment stability relative 
to firms without employee ownership programs, and also of whether 
such firms were less likely to lay off workers when faced with negative 
shocks more broadly. In our econometric analyses, we use a rich array 
of measures of employee ownership at firms, including 
• the presence of employee ownership stock in pension plans, 
• the presence of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), 
• the value of employee ownership stock per employee, 
• the share of the firm owned by employees, 
• the share of workers at the firm participating in employee owner-
ship, and 
• the share of workers at the firm participating in ESOPs. 
We also consider both economy-wide negative shock measures 
(increases in the unemployment rate, declines in the employment-to-
population ratio) and firm-specific negative shock measures (declines 
in firm sales, declines in firm stock price). 
The firm data that we use to examine the relationship between 
employee ownership and employment stability come from Standard 
and Poor’s Industrial Compustat database on publicly traded compa-
nies, matched to Form 5500 pension data collected by the USDOL, 
which contain detailed information on employee ownership in ESOPs 
and other defined contribution pension plans. These are administra-
tive data for the population of publicly traded firms. This represents an 
improvement over data sets based on samples that are generally drawn 
from special surveys suffering from small sample sizes and bias from 
self-selection of respondents.1 A further advantage is that we are able 
to follow firms over time, which allows us to use panel methods in 
our econometric analyses to help control for unobserved firm-specific 
effects. Our findings show strong evidence that employee ownership 
firms are less likely to reduce employment in the face of economy-wide 
and firm-specific negative shocks. 
This examination constitutes an important contribution to the 
research on employee ownership and has important implications for 
government policymakers and employers. It presents large-scale empir-
ical evidence on the role of employee ownership in employment stabil-
ity during recessions. It also underscores the importance of government 
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policy that encourages employee ownership as a policy tool to curb 
unemployment during recessions. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Why would we expect firms with employee ownership programs to 
exhibit greater employment security during economic downturns? 
Firms often introduce employee ownership programs as a means of 
building a long-term cooperative employment relationship with their 
employees, and a lower incidence of layoffs can be a means of main-
taining the credibility of the firm’s commitment to that relationship. 
Employee ownership firms may provide greater employment security as 
part of an overall effort to build a more cooperative workplace culture 
and a sense of psychological ownership (Pierce, Rubenfeld, and Morgan 
1991). This cooperative culture can increase worker effort, as well as 
create a general willingness on the part of workers to make adjustments 
during times of economic distress, both of which can increase firm pro-
ductivity and lower the firm’s need to lay off workers during downturns. 
Employee ownership can also increase firm revenues, as employees 
may be more willing to share technical information with management, 
which can increase production efficiency. Indeed, numerous empirical 
studies have linked employee ownership to increased productivity and 
other performance measures, as was reviewed in Chapter 1. 
Apart from any effects that workplace culture may have on pro-
ductivity, employee ownership may help to instill a sense of psycho-
logical ownership, which firms maintain in part through a commitment 
to preserve employee jobs. Such a workplace culture could increase 
employee willingness to invest in valuable firm-specific skills. 
There may be a stabilizing effect of employee ownership if it 
increases the flexibility of compensation, although this is likely to 
occur only under special circumstances. While firms may contribute 
less company stock to employees during hard times, this flexibility is 
no different from what happens in other defined contribution pension 
plans in which the company contribution may vary year to year. Extra 
flexibility due to employee ownership would occur only if 1) employer 
stock substitutes for wages or other benefits and 2) the returns from 
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employer stock (dividends and share price increase) are seen as part 
of employee compensation. When these conditions hold and negative 
demand shocks occur, the decrease in company stock value provides an 
automatic “pay cut” for workers, and the lower fixed component of pay 
(due to substitution of employee ownership for fixed pay) means that 
firms will have less incentive to lay off workers.2 
PAST STUDIES ON EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP AND 
EMPLOYMENT STABILITY 
A number of past empirical studies examined related issues, and 
one of the goals of the current study is to update some of these earlier 
findings and understand how employee ownership firms weathered the 
recessions of the 2000s. 
Pencavel and Craig (1992, 1994) studied the plywood worker coop-
eratives (companies in which 100 percent, or almost 100 percent, of 
the company’s stock is held by its workers) in the U.S. Pacific North-
west and found that cooperatives kept employment stable but, instead, 
adjusted wages in response to a negative product price over the analysis 
window of 1968–1986. These results seem to be achieved without com-
promising efficiency, since productivity levels were 6–14 percent higher 
among the plywood cooperatives compared to conventional companies 
(Craig et al. 1995). Pencavel, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2006) exam-
ined employment and wages at worker-owned and conventional enter-
prises in Italy using a matched employer-worker panel for 1982–1994 
and, similarly, found that worker-owned firms had lower wages and 
more variable wages than conventional firms but also had less vola-
tile employment. Numerous other studies using panel data on worker 
cooperatives from various countries in Europe and South America have 
found analogous results (Burdin and Dean 2009; Jones et al. 2013). 
Blair, Kruse, and Blasi (2002) tracked U.S. public companies with 
broad-based employee ownership plans holding more than 17 percent 
of company stock over 1983–1995 and compared them to otherwise-
similar firms in the same industries. They found that employee owner-
ship was associated with greater employment stability, which did not 
come at the expense of firm efficiency, given that the stock market per-
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formance of the employee ownership firms was slightly better than that 
of other firms. Similarly, studies have found employee ownership to 
be associated with greater employment stability in a broader sample 
of U.S. public companies from 1988 to 2001 (Park, Kruse, and Sesil 
2004), and in a sample of U.S. closely held companies from 1988 to 
1999 (Blasi, Kruse, and Weltmann 2013). 
There is some evidence suggesting that employees may exert for-
mal or informal pressures to increase job security in employee owner-
ship firms. For example, a majority of Americans say that if they owned 
company stock and an outside investor was attempting a takeover, they 
would not sell, even for twice the market value of the stock (Kruse 
and Blasi [1999], citing a 1994 EBRI/Gallup poll). This appears to be
due to concerns that an outside investor would lay off workers (Kruse, 
Freeman, and Blasi 2010). 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The firm data for this project were drawn from two sources: 1) 
Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat database on publicly traded 
companies and 2) the Form 5500 pension plan data collected by the 
USDOL. The Compustat data comprise information on firm charac-
teristics including total employment and financial information, while 
the Form 5500 pension plan data set contains detailed information on 
employee ownership in ESOPs and other defined contribution pension 
plans. We matched firm records from the Compustat data and Form 
5500 data using each firm’s unique IRS Employer Identification Num-
ber for the 13 years spanning 1999–2011, resulting in the firm-year 
panel data set on which all of our analyses are based. 
Our data set is composed of the full population of publicly traded 
companies in the United States. As noted earlier, this data set provides 
an advantage over data sets drawn from special surveys suffering from 
small sample sizes and self-selection of respondents. It also allows us 
to conduct longitudinal analyses in order to help control for unobserved 
firm-specific effects. Furthermore, the data span a decade when the 
United States experienced two recessions, in 2001 and 2008, allowing 
us to examine how employee ownership firms weathered these eco-
 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
52 Kurtulus and Kruse 
nomic downturns relative to nonemployee ownership companies. We 
also have an array of measures of employee ownership at companies, 
including the presence of employee ownership through pension pro-
grams and ESOPs, and the extent of such employee ownership in terms 
of total participation and share of the firm owned by workers. 
Our goal is to understand whether firms with employee ownership 
programs exhibit greater employment stability in the face of economic 
downturns. We examine six different measures of employee ownership 
within firms in our empirical analyses in particular: 
1. Any employee ownership: whether a firm reported any em-
ployee ownership stock in any of its defined contribution pension plans, 
including employee ownership in 401(k) plans, ESOPs, and deferred 
profit-sharing plans in a given year.3 
2. ESOP: whether a firm reported having an ESOP plan in a given 
year. 
3. Employee ownership stock value per employee at the firm: 
total employee-owned stock value in dollars, divided by total number of 
employees (including nonowners) at a firm in a given year.4 
4. Percentage of company owned by employees: the share of the 
firm owned by employees in a given year. 
5. Employee owners as a percentage of employees: the share of 
all employees participating in employee ownership at a firm in a given 
year. 
6. ESOP participants as a percentage of employees: the share of 
all employees participating in ESOPs at a firm in a given year. 
To understand how firms with employee ownership programs 
respond to economic downturns, we first consider a fairly broad proxy 
of economic conditions—namely, the unemployment rate. Figure 3.1 
illustrates trends in the national unemployment rate during 1999–2011. 
The recessions starting in 2001 and 2008 are clearly seen in this figure 
as sustained increases in the unemployment rate (from 3.97 percent in 
2000 up to 5.99 percent in 2003, and from 4.62 percent in 2007 up to 
9.63 percent in 2010). 
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SOURCE: Based on labor force statistics from the Current Population Survey season-
ally adjusted unemployment rate for ages 16 and older. 
As a first step in understanding how firms with employee ownership 
vary their employment with changes in the unemployment rate, we plot 
in Figure 3.2 the average yearly percentage change in employment over 
2000–2010 at firms with and without any employee ownership in their 
defined contribution plans. As the figure clearly illustrates, employment 
was more stable at firms with employee ownership than at firms with-
out during 2000–2010: employment declines were smaller at employee 
ownership firms during years when overall employment shrunk across 
firms; employment increases were also smaller at employee ownership 
firms during years with overall employment growth across all firms. 
This trend is also evident in Panels B and C of Figure 3.2, which illus-
trate yearly percentage change in employment at firms with and with-
out ESOPs, and at firms with and without at least 5 percent of the firm 
owned by employees. Note that the threshold of 5 percent meets the 
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Figure 3.2  Average Yearly Percentage Change in Employment by 
Employee Ownership, 2000–2010 
Panel A: Percentage change in employment by “Any employee ownership” (firm 
reported any EO stock) 
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Panel B: Average yearly percentage change in employment by ESOP status 
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Figure 3.2  (continued) 
Panel C: Average yearly percentage change in employment for companies with greater 
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EO percent owned > 5% 
EO percent owned < 5% 
SOURCE: Based on authors’ calculations from the USDOL Form 5500 pension data-
base. 
Although Figure 3.2 illustrates the basic story, we would like to 
know whether the positive relationship between employment stability 
and employee ownership holds when we control for firm characteristics. 
We therefore estimate standard regressions, estimating the relationship 
between the yearly percentage change in employment at firms and each 
of our six measures of employee ownership when the firm faces nega-
tive demand shocks. We use two economy-wide measures of demand 
shocks—1) unemployment rate and 2) employment-to-population ratio. 
Changes in the employment-to-population rate may serve as a better 
measure of economic downturn than the unemployment rate, because 
the latter counts individuals who are not working but seeking employ-
ment, which is often difficult to measure accurately. We also examine 
employment stability in the face of two types of firm-level negative 
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shocks: 1) decline in firm sales since the previous year and 2) decline in 
firm stock price since the previous year. 
In our regressions we control for firm characteristics, including cap-
ital stock growth (to control for mergers and divestitures), union sta-
tus (to control for union-influenced employment stability), interactions 
between demand shocks and average firm size (to control for differen-
tial response between larger and smaller firms), industry and industry-
specific trends, and firm fixed effects (to control for time-invariant firm 
characteristics).5 In our regressions, we focus on employee ownership 
as of the prior year so that we can be more sure that the employee own-
ership was a plausible cause rather than effect of the demand shocks. 
While our basic method controls for any general differences among 
firms in their employment growth or decline (through the fixed effects), 
it is nonetheless possible that the responsiveness to demand shocks 
may vary among firms in a way that affects our estimates. For exam-
ple, some firms may have developed methods of avoiding layoffs when 
negative demand shocks occur, and these firms may be more likely to 
adopt employee ownership. In this case the employee ownership would 
be more of a symptom than a cause of reduced layoffs. We can test this 
possibility by analyzing firms that switched employee ownership status 
within the period, through either adopting or dropping employee own-
ership, and comparing their response to negative demand shocks when 
they do and do not have employee ownership. To implement this test, 
for each of the demand shocks we identify companies in our sample that 
experienced at least one negative shock with, and one negative shock 
without, employee ownership.6 While this sample is limited, it allows 
us to explore whether the same firm appears to act differently when it 
does and does not have employee ownership. 
To streamline the exposition of results, we have summary tables with 
key findings representing the estimated implied percentage changes in 
firm employment in response to each of the types of demand shocks. 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Table 3.1 depicts descriptive statistics by presence of employee 
ownership programs, and it illustrates, among other results, that EO 
firms were on average larger, grew more slowly than non-EO firms, 
were more likely to be unionized as indicated by a union pension plan, 
and were more likely to be in the transportation and finance industries, 
while less likely to be in the service industry, than non-EO firms. These 
differences by employee ownership status indicate the importance of 
controlling for these characteristics in our estimates, since stability may 
be influenced by firm size, union status, and industry trends. Within the 
employee ownership firms, the average dollar value of employee own-
ership stock per employee was $10,540, the share of the firm owned by 
employees was 3.3 percent, and the share of workers at the firm partici-
pating in employee ownership was 72 percent. 
The extent of employee ownership within firms is explored in more 
detail in Table 3.2. There is considerable variation in employee owner-
ship assets per employee, with a “low” value (twenty-fifth percentile) of 
$949, a “high” value (seventy-fifth percentile) of $12,967, and a “very 
high” value (ninety-fifth percentile) of $44,414. (Note that these are 
averages across all employees in the firm, not just those owning stock.) 
Since these are publicly held companies, most of the stock is held by 
outside shareholders. Employees typically own just a small percentage 
of these companies, with a median of 1.5 percent and a ninety-fifth per-
centile of 11.9 percent, indicating that in only 5 percent of the EO com-
panies do employees own about one-eighth or more of the company. 
There is less variation in the employee coverage measures, for which 
Table 3.2 shows that employee owners are four-fifths (80.2 percent) 
of all employees in the median EO firm, and ESOP participants are 
three-fourths (74.6 percent) of all employees in the median ESOP firm. 
This broad coverage is not surprising, given that our employee owner-
ship measure is based on Form 5500 data for pension plans, which are 
required to be broad-based to qualify for tax deductibility. 
Table 3.3 summarizes the results from the regressions examining 
the percentage change in within-firm employment in response to nega-
tive shocks (based on the full regression estimates reported in Tables 
3A.1 through 3A.4). The first column summarizes the results from the 
  
58  Table 3.1  Descriptive Statistics on Public Company Sample 
Any employee ownership No employee ownership 
Mean Std. dev. Obs. Mean Std. dev. Obs. 
Employee size 14,128 60,808 18,620 4,185 20,544 67,276 
Employment change (natural logarithm) 0.012 0.213 16,814 0.025 0.347 55,987 
ESOP 0.350 0.477 18,620 0.000 0.000 67,276 
EO assets per employee ($) 10,540 16,195 18,429 0.000 0.000 67,276 
EO as % of firm ownership 0.033 0.056 17,395 0.000 0.000 59,092 
Employee owners as % of all employees 0.721 0.283 18,620 0.000 0.000 67,276 
ESOP participants as % of all employees 0.229 0.366 18,620 0.000 0.000 67,276 
Sales ($ millions) 4,186 16,416 18,611 1,181 6,057 67,071 
Sales change (natural logarithm) 0.056 0.252 16,743 0.091 0.460 53,050 
Sales change if increase 0.160 0.182 11,372 0.289 0.373 34,566 
Sales change if decrease −0.164 0.237 5,371 −0.279 0.371 18,440 
Stock price change (%) −0.040 0.573 16,333 −0.128 0.842 50,983 
Stock price change if increase 0.333 0.332 8,635 0.491 0.517 23,926 
Stock price change if decrease −0.450 0.508 7,664 0.682 0.680 26,758 
Capital stock change (natural logarithm) 0.055 0.443 13,639 0.078 1.265 48,790 
Union pension plan 0.210 0.408 18,620 0.055 0.228 67,276 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 0.004 0.060 18,620 0.003 0.054 67,276 
Mining 0.034 0.181 18,620 0.043 0.203 67,276 
Construction 0.011 0.104 18,620 0.009 0.092 67,276 
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Manufacturing 0.372 0.483 18,620 0.375 0.484 67,276 
Transportation, communications, and utilities 0.112 0.315 18,620 0.092 0.289 67,276 
Wholesale trade 0.029 0.168 18,620 0.031 0.172 67,276 
Retail trade 0.070 0.255 18,620 0.050 0.217 67,276 
Finance, insurance, and real estate 0.251 0.434 18,620 0.187 0.390 67,276 
Service 0.114 0.318 18,620 0.196 0.397 67,276 
Public administration 0.003 0.056 18,620 0.015 0.122 67,276 
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly 
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Table 3.2  Amounts of Employee Ownership within Employee 
Ownership Firms 
Low Median High Very high Number of 
(25th (50th (75th (95th firm-year 
percentile) percentile) percentile) percentile) Average observations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EO assets per 
employeea ($) 
EO as % of firm 
ownership 
Employee owners 
as % of all 
employees 
ESOP participants 
as % of all 
employees 
949 3,937 12,967 44,414 10,540 18,429 
0.5 1.5 3.9 11.9 3.3 17,395 
52.5 80.2 100.0 100.0 72.4 18,539 
47.6 74.6 96.9 100.0 68.8 7,515 
NOTE: Restricted to years in which firm had positive values of employee ownership.
EO = employee ownership. 
a Calculated across all employees in company, not just participants in employee owner-
ship plan. 
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard 
and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly traded companies in the United 
States. 
specification in which the negative shock measure we use is increased 
unemployment rate, the second column uses decreased employment-
to-population ratio, the third column uses decreased firm sales, and the 
final column uses decreased stock price. 
Unemployment Rate 
Our first set of results, presented in column 1 of Table 3.3, indicates 
support for our hypothesis that employee ownership firms reduce their 
employment by a smaller percentage when faced with a negative shock 
compared to firms without employee ownership. 
When the unemployment rate increases by 1.0 percent, firms without 
employee ownership in any of their defined contribution plans decrease 
employment by 3.0 percent, while firms with any employee ownership 
in their defined contribution plans decrease employment by only 2.8 
percent, and firms with any ESOPs decrease employment by only 1.7 
percent. The second of these differences is strong enough to reject ran-
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Table 3.3  Summary of Overall Relationship between Employee 
Ownership and Employment Stability 
% change in company employment in 
response to negative demand shocks 
Economy 
Negative Unemploy- employ- Firm stock 
shock: ment rate ment rate Firm sales price down 
up 1% down 1% down 10% 10% 
No employee ownership −3.0 −4.2 −4.0 −0.7 
Any employee ownership −2.8 −3.9 −4.0 −1.0 
Any ESOP −1.7 −2.7 −3.2 −1.0 
Average EO assets per employee ($) 
Zero −3.0 −4.2 −3.8 −0.7 
Mean (10,540) −2.1 −3.1 −2.9 −0.5 
Low (947) −2.9 −4.1 −3.7 −0.7 
Median (3,937) −2.7 −3.8 −3.4 −0.6 
High (12,967) −2.0 −2.8 −2.7 −0.5 
Very high (44,414) 0.6 0.4 −0.3 0.1 
By % of company owned by employees 
Zero −3.0 −4.2 −3.7 −0.7 
Mean (3.3) −2.9 −4.1 −3.8 −0.7 
Low (0.5) −3.0 −4.2 −3.7 −0.7 
Median (1.5) −2.9 −4.1 −3.8 −0.7 
High (3.9) −2.9 −4.0 −3.8 −0.7 
Very high (11.9) −2.6 −3.7 −4.1 −0.9 
By % of workers in EO 
Zero −3.0 −4.2 −3.6 −0.7 
Mean (72.4) −2.3 −3.3 −3.3 −0.8 
Low (52.5) −2.5 −3.6 −3.4 −0.8 
Median (80.2) −2.3 −3.2 −3.3 −0.8 
High (100) −2.1 −3.0 −3.2 −0.9 
By % of workers in ESOP 
Zero −3.0 −4.1 −3.7 −0.7 
Mean (68.8) −1.4 −2.2 −2.2 −0.5 
Low (47.6) −1.9 −2.8 −2.6 −0.6 
Median (74.7) −1.3 −2.0 −2.0 −0.5 
High (96.9) −0.8 −1.4 −1.6 −0.4 
Very high (100) −0.7 −1.3 −1.5 −0.4 
NOTE: Based on regression results reported in Appendix Tables 3A.1 to 3A.4. Figures 
in bold are based on statistically significant employee ownership × negative shock 
interactions (at the 95% level). 
SOURCE: Data from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and 
Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly traded companies in the United States.
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dom sampling error as an explanation. We see a statistically stronger 
relationship when we turn our attention to the value of employee own-
ership stock per employee at the firm: when the unemployment rate 
increases by 1 percent, firms where the value of employee ownership 
assets per worker is low (where “low” is defined as being at the twenty-
fifth percentile of the distribution) decrease their employment by 2.9 
percent, in contrast to firms where the value of employee ownership 
is at the median (fiftieth percentile), high (seventy-fifth percentile), or 
very high (ninety-fifth percentile) levels, at which employment declines 
by only 2.7 percent, 2.0 percent, and 0.6 percent, respectively. Employ-
ment declines are only statistically weakly related to the percentage of 
the firm owned by employees, but they are statistically strongly related 
to employee coverage: when the unemployment rate increases by 1 
percent, firms where the share of workers in employee ownership is 
zero, low, at the median, and high experience an employment decrease 
of 3.0 percent, 2.5 percent, 2.3 percent, and 2.1 percent, respectively. 
Likewise, firms in which the share of workers in ESOPs is zero, low, 
at the median, high, and very high experience an employment decrease 
of 3.0 percent, 1.9 percent, 1.3 percent, 0.8 percent, and 0.7 percent, 
respectively. 
Employment-to-Population Ratio 
As mentioned before, changes in the employment-to-population 
rate serve as a better measure of economic downturn than the unem-
ployment rate because the latter considers individuals who are not 
working but are seeking employment, which can be difficult to measure 
accurately. Therefore, we also estimate all our regressions treating as 
our indicator of economic downturn a decline in the annual employ-
ment-to-population rate rather than an increase in the annual unemploy-
ment rate. Figure 3.3 illustrates the trajectory of the employment-to-
population rate over the period 1999–2011. 
The results summarized in column 2 of Table 3.3, using the employ-
ment-to-population ratio, show strong evidence that EO firms provide 
greater employment security than non-EO firms during economic 
downturns. 
Firms with no employee ownership experience a 4.2 percent 
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SOURCE: Based on labor force statistics from the Current Population Survey season-
ally adjusted employment-to-population rate for ages 16 and older. 
down by 1.0 percent, in contrast to firms with employee ownership, 
in which employment decreases by only 3.9 percent, and firms with 
ESOPs, in which employment decreases by 2.7 percent. Once again, 
only the second difference is strong enough to reject sampling error. 
Firms with zero, low, median, and high EO assets per employee reduce 
employment by 4.2 percent, 4.1 percent, 3.8 percent, and 2.8 percent, 
respectively (while the estimate for very high EO assets per employee 
is actually a 0.4 percent increase in employment). Again, the pattern 
is favorable but statistically weak when examining share of the com-
pany owned by workers, while it is favorable and statistically strong 
when examining employee coverage in any EO or in ESOPs. When 
the employment-to-population ratio goes down by 1.0 percent, firms 
with zero, low, median, and high shares of employees who are own-
ers reduce their employment by 4.2 percent, 3.6 percent, 3.2 percent, 
and 3.0 percent, respectively, and firms with zero, low, median, high, 
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by 4.1 percent, 2.8 percent, 2.0 percent, 1.4 percent, and 1.3 percent, 
respectively. 
Decline in Firm Sales 
We next examine employment stability in the face of firm-level 
negative shocks using two specific measures: 1) decline in firm sales 
since the previous year and 2) decline in firm stock price since the pre-
vious year. Column 3 of Table 3.3 summarizes our regression findings 
on the extent to which firms with EO programs exhibit smaller employ-
ment declines when they experience a 10 percent decrease in their sales. 
Here we find fewer statistically strong relationships with EO measures 
than when we use the economy-wide measures of demand shocks. 
The strongest findings occur with respect to two areas: 1) EO assets 
per employee and 2) percentage of workers in an ESOP. A 10 percent 
decrease in sales is linked to a 3.3 percent decline in employment when 
EO assets per employee are zero. When these assets are at their low, 
median, high, and very high values, the employment declines are 3.3 
percent, 3.0 percent, 2.3 percent, and 0.1 percent, respectively. Simi-
larly, as the share of employees who are ESOP participants increases, 
the employment decline drops from 3.3 percent when no workers are 
covered to 1.1 percent when all workers are covered. 
Decline in Firm Stock Price 
As with the sales measure, the stock price measure provides fewer 
strong relationships between EO and employment declines than do the 
economy-wide measures. The one measure showing a favorable rela-
tionship is EO assets per employee: when a firm’s stock price declines 
by 10 percent, firms with zero EO assets per employee have an employ-
ment decline of 0.7 percent. This employment decline is reduced to 0.6 
percent and 0.5 percent at the median and high levels of EO assets per 
employee and essentially disappears at the very high level. There is a 
puzzling but small positive relationship between employment declines 
and the percentage of the company owned by employees, indicating 
that the employment decline is 0.7 percent at low levels but 0.9 percent 
at very high levels of percentage of company owned. A caution on this 
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the result disappears when we add prior employment change or take 
out the interactions between firm size and demand shocks as predic-
tors. (Also, the results for other measures become more favorable to the 
stabilizing effect of EO, but here we present the results from the base 
specification for the sake of consistency.) 
PROBING ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
There are a variety of ways in which the regressions testing for 
employment stability can be specified. Our investigation of a number of 
alternative specifications produced the same general pattern of results.7 
One key issue is causality: does employee ownership lead to stability, 
or do more stable firms adopt employee ownership? This can be exam-
ined in part by examining the responses of the same firms before and 
after they adopt or drop employee ownership. Since we are focused on 
the effects of negative demand shocks, we break out companies (called 
“EO switchers”) that experienced at least one negative demand shock 
with employee ownership and one without employee ownership. If 
employee ownership firms are simply more stable to begin with (before 
adopting employee ownership), there should be no difference in their 
EO and non-EO years, while there should be a difference if employee 
ownership plays a plausible role in employment stability. 
A total of 391 firms met our criteria to be EO switchers for the 
economy-wide measures (that is, they experienced at least one reces-
sion year with employee ownership and one without employee owner-
ship), while for the firm-specific measures of sales and stock price, 376 
and 536 firms, respectively, met our criteria as EO switchers. While 
these are not large samples and there may be other unobserved factors 
at work, these firms can nonetheless shed light on the role of employee 
ownership in stability. 
Table 3.4 summarizes the results from studying these switchers 
(based on fuller results presented in Appendix Tables 3A.5–3A.8). 
As shown in column 1, when they did not have employee ownership, 
their average response to an increase in the unemployment rate was a 
2.1 percent decline in employment, while having average EO assets 
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Table 3.4  Summary of Changes in Employment Stability for Employee 
Ownership Switchers 
% change in company employment in 
response to negative demand shocks 
Economy 
Unemploy- employment Firm stock 
ment rate up rate down Firm sales price down 
Negative shock 1% 1% down 10% 10% 
Response of non-EO firms −3.1 −4.3 −3.3 −0.7 
Responses of EO switchers 
during time that they had: 
No employee ownership −2.1 −3.1 −3.5 −0.6 
Any employee ownership −2.7 −3.9 −3.4 −1.0 
ESOP −1.6 −2.3 −2.6 −0.8 
Mean of EO assets/employee −1.4 −2.6 −2.5 −0.6 
Mean of % of company owned −2.8 −3.8 −3.6 −0.9 
by employees 
Mean of % of workers in EO −2.5 −3.5 −3.3 −1.0 
Mean of % of workers in ESOP −1.3 −2.2 −1.5 −0.7 
NOTE: “Switchers” = firms that adopted or dropped employee ownership and had 
negative demand shocks during periods both with and without employee ownership. 
Based on regression results reported in Appendix Tables 3A.5–3A.8. Figures in bold 
are based on statistically significant employee ownership × negative shock × switcher 
interactions (at the 95% level). 
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard 
and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly traded companies in the United 
States. 
mean percentage of workers in an ESOP is linked to only a 1.3 percent 
decline. These two EO measures show similar results when the negative 
demand shock is measured as a decrease in the employment/population 
ratio (column 2) or a 10 percent decrease in firm sales (column 3). The 
results for other EO measures in columns 1–3 are mixed, but none are 
strong enough to reject sampling error. In addition, none of the results 
for stock price in column 4 showed increased stability as firms switched 
to employee ownership, while three replicate the puzzling result noted 
in Table 3.3 of employee ownership being linked to greater employment 
responses to stock price declines. One potential difficulty with the stock 
price measure is that it reflects investor evaluations of future profitabil-
ity, and as such it is sensitive to firm news such as increased layoffs. So 
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of employment cutbacks rather than an exogenous predictor of declines 
in demand for the firm’s products. 
Therefore, the analysis of EO switchers points to possible changes 
in employment behavior as firms adopt employee ownership, particu-
larly with regard to the measures of EO assets per employee and per-
centage of workers in an ESOP. 
We further probed the results in three ways. First, we used the lagged 
change in logarithm of employment as a control, to address possible 
correlations between unobserved variables and the lagged dependent 
variable as identified by Arellano and Bond (1991). The results using 
the Arellano-Bond correction were actually slightly more favorable to 
the stabilizing effect of employee ownership than the results we present 
here. Second, we omitted change in capital stock as a control variable, 
since that is potentially endogenous with respect to determination of 
the employment level. This omission, however, made no noteworthy 
difference in our results of interest. Third, we omitted the interactions 
between firm size and the demand shocks, which made no difference in 
the estimates using the economy-wide demand shocks but weakened 
the results using the sales measure. We believe it is appropriate to con-
trol for these interactions since employee ownership firms are larger on 
average (as shown in Table 3.1), and larger firms have larger propor-
tional responses to sales decreases (as shown in Appendix Table 3A.3). 
Overall, we find that results from these additional tests are broadly con-
sistent with the results presented here. 
CONCLUSION 
Using data matched between USDOL Form 5500 and the Indus-
trial Compustat database on all publicly traded U.S. companies during 
1999–2011, this chapter has shown that firms with employee owner-
ship are linked to greater employment stability in the face of an eco-
nomic downturn when measured as macroeconomic negative shocks 
(increases in the unemployment rate, decreases in the employment-
to-population ratio) as well as firm-specific negative shocks (declines 
in firm sales). The size of the effects varies by employee ownership 
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assets per employee, employee owners as a percentage of all employ-
ees, and ESOP participants as a percentage of all employees. While we 
have only limited data to examine changes in employment behavior as 
firms adopt or drop employee ownership, our tests point to increased 
stability for firms that switch employee ownership status when they 
have high EO assets per employee or a high percentage of employees 
covered by an ESOP. 
These findings highlight the role that employee ownership may 
play in stabilizing employment, particularly during recessions. They 
also underscore the importance of government policy that encourages 
employee ownership as a policy tool to curb unemployment during 
recessions, as we will discuss in the final chapter. 
Notes 
1. Our data do not contain firms with employee ownership that are not publicly 
traded, either because they are privately held or because they are completely 
employee owned. 
2. This dynamic would be similar to the theorized effect of profit sharing on employ-
ment stability proposed by Weitzman (1984), since the short-run marginal cost of 
labor would be lower than the marginal revenue product of labor, leading firms to 
retain workers. 
3. Note that this measure understates employee ownership in pension plans because 
it does not include employee ownership in master trusts or collective trusts that 
combine assets of several plans. 
4. Note that this will be understated when employee ownership stock is held in mas-
ter trusts or collective trusts that combine assets of several plans. 
5. Specifically, we estimate the following ordinary least squares specification, which 
illustrates the magnitude of employment changes in response to changes in the 
unemployment rate at EO firms as compared to non-EO firms: 
LNEMPCH  = β  + β  NegD  + β PosD  + β  NegD  × EO  + βit 0 1 it 2 it 3 it it−1 4
 × EO  + β  × NegD  × Avgemp  + β PosD  × Avgemp  +PosDit it−1 5 it i 6 it i
 + θ  + ε ,Xit i it 
where 
LNEMPCHit = ln(employment) at firm i in year t −ln(employment) at firm i in year 
t − 1, winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles to reduce the influence of 
extreme values. 
EOit−1 = employee ownership variable at firm i in year t − 1, alternatively mea-
sured as 1) dummy for any employee ownership, 2) dummy for ESOP, 3) average 
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employee-owned stock per employee in dollars (across all employees, not just 
participants), 4) proportion of company owned by employees, 5) employee own-
ers as proportion of all employees, and 6) ESOP participants as proportion of all 
employees. 
NegDit = Negative demand shock from t − 1 to t, alternatively measured as
1) percentage-point increase in the U.S. unemployment rate, 2) percentage-point 
decrease in the U.S. employment/population ratio, 3) decrease in firm ln(sales), and 
4) percentage decrease in firm stock price. This variable takes the value 0 if there 
was no negative demand shock. 
PosDit = Positive demand shock from t − 1 to t, alternatively measured as
1) percentage-point decrease in unemployment rate, 2) percentage-point increase 
in employment/population ratio, 3) increase in ln(sales), and 4) percentage 
increase in stock price. This variable takes the value 0 if there was no positive 
demand shock. 
Avgempi = Mean of ln(employment) within firm across all reported years. 
Xit = vector of firm controls for firm i in year t, including capital stock growth, 
presence of collectively bargained pension plan, industry dummies, and linear and 
quadratic industry-specific time trends (Industry i × t and Industry i × t2). 
θi = firm fixed effects. 
Our hypothesis is that β1 < 0 and β3 > 0—i.e., employment will decline by a smaller 
percentage at EO firms than at non-EO firms in response to negative demand 
shocks (with the decrease in employment being β3 percent smaller in magnitude at 
EO firms than at non-EO firms). 
We exclude the EOit − 1 main effect since 1) any general differences in employ-
ment changes between EO and non-EO firms will be captured by the firm fixed 
effects and 2) the responsiveness of firms to demand shocks may be affected by 
their changes in employment growth associated with EO, so that an EO main 
effect would partly capture the stabilizing effect we are trying to estimate. We 
nonetheless include EO main effects in supplementary regressions and obtained 
similar results. 
To probe the robustness of results, we use year dummies in place of the time 
trends, with similar results for the coefficient estimates on the interaction between 
the demand shock and employee ownership. 
6. The estimating equation for this specification is: 
LNEMPCH  = β  + β  NegD  + β  PosD  + β  NegD  × EOswitcherit 0 1 it 2 it 3 it i 
+ β  × PosD  × EOswitcher  + β  NegD  × EOswitcher  × EO4 it i 5 it i it−1 
+ β  PosD  × EOswitcher  × EO6 it i it−1 
+ β  × NegD  × EOnonswitcher  × EO7 it i it−1 
+ β  PosD  × EOnonswitcher  × EO  + β  × NegD  × Avgemp 8 it i it−1 9 it i 
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where 
EOswitcheri = Firm i had at least one negative demand shock with, and one with-
out, employee ownership. 
EOnonswitcheri = Firm i had employee ownership but did not meet the standard 
for EOswitcheri. All other variables as defined in previous note. 
β1+ β3 + β9(Avgempi) measures the response to negative demand shocks for switch-
ers when they do not have employee ownership, and β5 measures any change in 
response to negative demand shocks when switchers have employee ownership. 





72  Table 3A.1  Employment Responses to General Demand Shocks: Unemployment Rate 
Negative demand shock: UR increase −0.029*** −0.030*** −0.02994*** −0.030*** −0.030*** −0.030*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.00137) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Positive demand shock: UR decrease 0.065*** 0.060*** 0.05711*** 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.00533) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Negative shock interacted with: 




EO assets per employee 0.00081*** 
(0.00010) 
EO % of company 0.037 
(0.036) 
EO share of employees 0.009*** 
(0.003) 
ESOP share of employees 0.023*** 
(0.004) 
Positive demand shock interacted with: 




EO assets per employee 0.00121*** 
(0.00036) 
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EO % of company −0.184* 
(0.104) 
EO share of employees 0.001 
(0.012) 
ESOP share of employees 0.005 
(0.015) 
Negative demand shock × average firm 0.001 0.001 0.00070 0.001 0.001 0.001 
ln(employment) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00071) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Positive demand shock × average firm −0.011*** −0.012*** −0.01271*** −0.012*** −0.012*** −0.012*** 
ln(employment) (0.003) (0.003) (0.00276) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm and industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61,241 61,241 61,120 54,915 61,241 61,241 
R-squared 0.125 0.125 0.12478 0.123 0.125 0.125 
Number of firms 8,356 8,356 8,355 7,752 8,356 8,356 
NOTE: The dependent variable = ln(employment change, winsorized). UR = unemployment rate. Fixed effects (within) regressions. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Firm 
and industry controls include collective bargaining status, change in capital stock, and industry trend and trend squared. 
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly 
traded companies in the United States. 
74  Table 3A.2  Employment Responses to General Demand Shocks: Employment/Population Ratio 
Negative demand shock: E/Pop decrease −0.040*** −0.041*** −0.04165*** −0.042*** −0.042*** −0.041*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.00163) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Positive demand shock: E/Pop increase 0.122*** 0.109*** 0.10306*** 0.106*** 0.110*** 0.107*** 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.00952) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Negative shock interacted with: 




EO assets per employee 0.00102*** 
(0.00013) 
EO % of company 0.044 
(0.042) 
EO share of employees 0.012*** 
(0.004) 
ESOP share of employees 0.028*** 
(0.005) 
Positive demand shock interacted with: 
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EO % of company −0.580*** 
(0.184) 
EO share of employees −0.026 
(0.022) 
ESOP share of employees −0.027 
(0.028) 
Negative demand shock × average firm 0.002** 0.001 0.00156* 0.001 0.001* 0.001 
ln(employment) 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.00086) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Positive demand shock × average firm −0.010** −0.013*** −0.01479*** −0.014*** −0.013*** −0.014*** 
ln(employment) 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.00479) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Firm and industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61,241 61,241 61,120 54,915 61,241 61,241 
R-squared 0.125 0.125 0.12547 0.123 0.125 0.125 
Number of firms 8,356 8,356 8,355 7,752 8,356 8,356 
NOTE: The dependent variable = ln(employment change, winsorized). Fixed effects (within) regressions. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Firm and industry controls include 
collective bargaining status, change in capital stock, and industry trend and trend squared. 
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly 
traded companies in the United States.
	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
76  Table 3A.3 Employment Responses to Firm-Specific Demand Shocks: Sales Changes 
Negative demand shock: sales decrease −0.357*** −0.362*** −0.37486*** −0.371*** −0.364*** −0.365*** 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.01554) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) 
Positive demand shock: sales increase 0.374*** 0.366*** 0.36387*** 0.382*** 0.368*** 0.364*** 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.01094) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Negative shock interacted with: 




EO assets per employee 0.00781*** 
(0.00127) 
EO percent of company −0.285 
(0.420) 
EO share of employees 0.048 
(0.037) 
ESOP share of employees 0.217*** 
(0.048) 
Positive demand shock interacted with: 




EO assets per employee −0.00023 
(0.00088) 
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EO % of company −0.322 
(0.372) 
EO share of employees −0.032 
(0.028) 
ESOP share of employees 0.014 
(0.052) 
Negative demand shock × average firm −0.047*** −0.049*** −0.05168*** −0.050*** −0.049*** −0.049*** 
ln(employment) 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.00533) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Positive demand shock × average firm 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.05286*** 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 
ln(employment) 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.00408) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Firm and industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 58,553 58,553 58,442 52,435 58,553 58,553 
R-squared 0.224 0.224 0.22455 0.222 0.224 0.224 
Number of firms 8,126 8,126 8,125 7,524 8,126 8,126 
NOTE: The dependent variable = ln(employment change, winsorized). Demand shocks measured as change in ln(sales), winsorized. Fixed 
effects (within) regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** 
significant at the 0.01 level. Firm and industry controls include collective bargaining status, change in capital stock, and industry trend 
and trend squared. 
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly 
traded companies in the United States.
	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
78  Table 3A.4 Employment Responses to Firm-Specific Demand Shocks: Stock Price Changes 
Negative demand shock: stock price decrease −0.061*** 
(0.004) 
Positive demand shock: stock price increase 0.007 
(0.005) 
Negative shock interacted with: 
Any EO −0.032*** 
(0.008) 
ESOP 
EO assets per employee 
EO % of company 
EO share of employees 
ESOP share of employees 
Positive demand shock interacted with: 
Any EO −0.032*** 
(0.010) 
ESOP 

















−0.068*** −0.065*** −0.069*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
0.003 0.003 0.000 
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EO % of company −0.142 
(0.107) 
EO share of employees −0.016 
(0.013) 
ESOP share of employees 0.017 
(0.019) 
Negative demand shock × average firm 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.01333*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
ln(employment) 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.00172) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Positive demand shock × average firm −0.003 −0.005** −0.00554*** −0.005** −0.004** −0.005** 
ln(employment) 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.00205) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm and industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 56,389 56,389 56,283 54,907 56,389 56,389 
R-squared 0.134 0.134 0.13424 0.134 0.134 0.134 
Number of firms 7,807 7,807 7,806 7,751 7,807 7,807 
NOTE: The dependent variable = ln(employment change, winsorized). Demand shocks measured as change in ln(stock price), winsorized. 
Fixed effects (within) regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; 
*** significant at the 0.01 level. Firm and industry controls include collective bargaining status, change in capital stock, and industry 
trend and trend squared. 
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly 
traded companies in the United States.
80  Table 3A.5  Employment Ownership Switchers and General Demand Shocks: Unemployment Rate 
UR increase −0.030*** −0.030*** −0.030*** −0.030*** −0.031*** −0.030*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
UR increase × (EO switcher) 0.010* 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.009* 0.005 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
UR increase × (EO switcher) × 




EO % of company −0.083 
(0.071) 
EO assets per employee 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
EO share of employees −0.003 
(0.008) 
ESOP share of employees 0.018** 
(0.007) 
UR increase × (EO nonswitcher) × 




EO % of company 0.054 
(0.037) 
 
   81 
EO assets per employee 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
EO share of employees 0.013*** 
(0.004) 
ESOP share of employees 0.027*** 
(0.005) 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61,241 61,241 60,000 61,120 61,241 61,241 
R-squared 0.125 0.125 0.124 0.125 0.125 0.125 
Number of firms 8,356 8,356 8,281 8,355 8,356 8,356 
Number of EO switchers 391 391 391 391 391 391 
Number of EO nonswitchers 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,444 
NOTE: The dependent variable = ln(employment change, winsorized). “EO switcher” = company had at least 1 EO and 1 non-EO observa-
tion in years when stock price declined. “EO nonswitcher” = other EO companies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant 
at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Control variables include collective bargaining status; 
change in capital stock; industry trends and trend squared; unemployment increase and its interaction with the EO switcher, the EO 
switcher times each EO measure, and the EO nonswitcher; and average ln(employment) interacted with unemployment increases and 
decreases. 
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly 
traded companies in the United States. 
82  Table 3A.6  Employment Ownership Switchers and General Demand Shocks: Employment/Population Ratio 
E/pop decrease −0.042*** −0.042*** −0.041*** −0.042*** −0.043*** −0.042*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
E/pop decrease × (EO switcher) 0.012** 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.012** 0.006 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
E/pop decrease × (EO switcher) × 




EO % of company −0.069 
(0.088) 
EO assets per employee 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
EO share of employees −0.005 
(0.009) 
ESOP share of employees 0.022** 
(0.009) 
E/pop decrease × (EO nonswitcher) × 




EO % of company 0.059 
(0.043) 
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EO assets per employee 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
EO share of employees 0.016*** 
(0.004) 
ESOP share of employees 0.033*** 
(0.006) 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 61,241 61,241 60,000 61,120 61,241 61,241 
R-squared 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.126 
Number of firms 8,356 8,356 8,281 8,355 8,356 8,356 
Number of EO switchers 391 391 391 391 391 391 
Number of EO nonswitchers 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,444 1,444 
NOTE: The dependent variable = ln(employment change, winsorized). E/pop = employment/population ratio. “EO switcher” = company 
had at least 1 EO and 1 non-EO observation in years when stock price declined. “EO nonswitcher” = other EO companies. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Control 
variables include collective bargaining status; change in capital stock; industry trends and trend squared; E/pop decrease and its interac-
tion with the EO switcher, the EO switcher times each EO measure, and the EO nonswitcher; and average ln(employment) interacted 
with E/pop increases and decreases. 
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly 
traded companies in the United States. 
84  Table 3A.7  Comparing Employment Responses among Employee Ownership Switchers across Sales Decreases 
Sales decrease −0.346*** −0.351*** −0.347*** −0.362*** −0.353*** −0.354*** 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Sales decrease × (EO switcher) −0.024 −0.017 −0.027 −0.040 −0.017 −0.023 
(0.052) (0.047) (0.047) (0.042) (0.053) (0.046) 
Sales decrease × (EO switcher) × 




EO % of company 0.418 
(1.012) 
EO assets per employee 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
EO share of employees 0.023 
(0.081) 
ESOP share of employees 0.289*** 
(0.080) 
Sales decrease × (EO nonswitcher) × 




EO % of company −0.717* 
(0.410) 
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EO assets per employee 0.007*** 
(0.001) 
EO share of employees 0.047 
(0.038) 
ESOP share of employees 0.193*** 
(0.058) 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 58,553 58,553 57,327 58,442 58,553 58,553 
R-squared 0.222 0.222 0.223 0.223 0.222 0.223 
Number of firms 8,126 8,126 8,052 8,125 8,126 8,126 
Number of EO switchers 376 376 376 376 376 376 
Number of EO nonswitchers 1,475 1,475 1,475 1,475 1,475 1,475 
NOTE: The dependent variable = ln(employment change, winsorized). “EO switcher” = company had at least 1 EO and 1 non-EO observa-
tion in years when stock price declined. “EO nonswitcher” = other EO companies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant 
at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Control variables include collective bargaining status; 
change in capital stock; industry trends and trend squared; sales increase and its interaction with the EO switcher, the EO switcher times 
each EO measure, and the EO nonswitcher; and average ln(employment) interacted with sales increases and decreases. 
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly 
traded companies in the United States. 
	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
86  Table 3A.8 Employee Ownership Switchers and Firm-Specific Demand Shocks: Stock Price Decreases 
Stock price decrease −0.060*** 
(0.004) 
Stock price decrease × (EO switcher) 0.006 
(0.013) 
Stock price decrease × (EO switcher) × 
Any EO −0.038*** 
(0.014) 
ESOP 
EO % of company 
EO assets per employee 
EO share of employees 
ESOP share of employees 
Stock price decrease × (EO nonswitcher) × 
Any EO −0.020** 
(0.010) 
ESOP 

















−0.065*** −0.064*** −0.064*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
−0.013 0.003 −0.012 
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EO assets per employee 0.001*** 
(0.001) 
EO share of employees −0.002 
(0.013) 
ESOP share of employees −0.004 
(0.018) 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 53,867 53,867 53,377 53,771 53,867 53,867 
R-squared 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 
Number of firms 7,585 7,585 7,577 7,584 7,585 7,585 
Number of EO switchers 536 536 536 536 536 536 
Number of EO nonswitchers 1,247 1,247 1,247 1,247 1,247 1,247 
NOTE: The dependent variable = ln(employment change, winsorized). “EO switcher” = company had at least 1 EO and 1 non-EO obser-
vation in years when stock price declined. “EO nonswitcher” = other EO companies. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant 
at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Control variables include collective bargaining status; 
change in capital stock; industry trends and trend squared; stock price increase and its interaction with the EO switcher, the EO switcher 
times each EO measure, and the EO nonswitcher; and average ln(employment) interacted with sales increases and decreases. 
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database matched to Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat data on publicly 
traded companies in the United States. 

4 
Do Employee Ownership Firms 
Survive Recessions 
Better than Other Firms? 
In this chapter, we turn our attention to the relationship between 
employee ownership and firm survival. Firm survival is an important 
outcome variable to examine, as it is generally an indicator of suc-
cess for a company, increases job security for workers employed, and 
thereby benefits the economy more broadly by reducing unemployment 
and economic hardship. It therefore also constitutes an important com-
ponent of any comprehensive analysis of employment stability. 
What are the channels through which employee ownership may 
enhance firm survival? There are five possible channels: 
As discussed in Chapter 2, previous research has shown employee 
ownership to be linked to increased firm and worker productivity through 
greater employee cooperation, commitment, and information sharing at 
the workplace. Despite the free-rider problem associated with group-
based pay, studies have generally found employee ownership to be linked 
to higher performance (Doucouliagos 1995; Kaarsemaker 2006; Kruse 
and Blasi 1997; O’Boyle, Patel, and Gonzalez-Mulé, forthcoming). 
1) Prior research has shown that employee ownership policies 
tend to be implemented along with other complementary 
high-performance workplace practices, such as employee 
involvement in decision making, team production, and on-the-
job training, to create a more engaged workplace, which can 
also contribute to improved survival outcomes in the face of 
financial distress (Becker and Huselid 1998; Blasi et al. 2010; 
DeVaro and Kurtulus 2010; Ichniowski et al. 1996; Ichniowski, 
Shaw, and Prennushi 1997; Kurtulus, Kruse, and Blasi 2011).1 
2) Employee ownership can reduce workplace conflict, which can 
contribute to production frictions and firm failure (Cramton, 
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3) Employee ownership tends to foster long-term employment 
relationships, which in turn encourage both employers and 
employees to make higher investments in firm-specific skills 
and facilitate increased productivity and survival prospects 
(Levine and Parkin 1994). 
4) Employee ownership may increase employee willingness to 
suggest and participate in innovations that enhance long-term 
firm performance and prospects (Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi 
2010). 
On the other hand, employee ownership may negatively impact firm 
survival if it contributes to increased communication friction among 
employees or otherwise creates conflicts or inefficiencies within firms 
that can lead to a higher rate of failure. There may be especially strong 
potential for conflict and collective action problems when employees 
have heterogeneous preferences, such as may occur when there are 
substantial shares of employees in different occupations or divisions of 
a firm (Hansmann 1996). For example, if employees in each division 
favor increased investment in their own division, there may be compli-
cated political conflicts in deciding where investment will occur. This 
concern primarily applies to cases where employees have strong roles 
in corporate governance, unlike the situation in most U.S. employee 
ownership companies. 
For our examination of the link between employee ownership and 
firm survival, we use data on the entire universe of publicly traded 
U.S. companies as of 1999, following them through 2010. We use 
the same data set as in Chapter 3, based on merging two sources:
1) federal Form 5500 data, which is collected by the U.S. Department 
of Labor (USDOL) and provides information on employee participa-
tion in employee ownership through pension plans, and 2) Standard and 
Poor’s Compustat data, which provide information on firm closures, 
mergers, acquisitions, and liquidations, as well as firm financial data. 
We estimate Cox hazard regressions predicting the probability of firm 
dissolution as a function of a wide array of measures of employee own-
ership and firm controls.2 
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PAST STUDIES ON EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP AND 
FIRM SURVIVAL 
Previous research on the relationship between employee ownership 
and firm survival is limited. Research on U.S. data shows that firms 
with employee ownership have higher survival rates. Blair, Kruse, and 
Blasi (2002) find that firms with 5 percent or more employee owner-
ship stakes in 1983 were 20 percent more likely than closely matched 
industry pairs to survive through 1995. Park, Kruse, and Sesil (2004) 
examined publicly traded companies in the United States between 1998 
and 2001 using hazard regression methods. They find that the firms in 
which employees owned 5 percent or more of the firm’s stock were 21 
percent more likely to survive through 2001. Welbourne and Cyr (1999) 
show that among companies with initial public offerings in 1988, those 
with broad-based ownership had higher rates of survival and stock-
price growth. 
The most recent study closest to ours is that of Blasi, Kruse, and 
Weltmann (2013), which uses a sample of closely held companies 
(without any publicly traded stock) from Dun and Bradstreet, in which 
ESOP companies were matched to non-ESOP companies in the same 
industry over the 1988–1999 period. This study finds that closely held 
ESOP companies in 1988 were only half as likely as non-ESOP firms to 
go bankrupt or close over the 1988–1999 period, and only three-fifths 
as likely to disappear for any reason. ESOP companies had significantly 
higher postadoption annual employment and sales growth, along with 
higher sales per employee. They were also four times more likely than 
their non-ESOP pairs to have defined benefit pension plans and other 
forms of defined contribution plans, which along with other data on 
the above-market compensation levels of most ESOPs indicates that 
greater survival does not come from lower labor costs. 
Evidence from outside the United States focuses on worker cooper-
atives. Burdin (2014) finds that worker cooperatives in Uruguay exhib-
ited death rates that were 29 percent lower than conventional firms. 
Pérotin (1987) finds that a shorter supply of capital funds is associated 
with future closure of cooperatives, while the business cycle appears to 
have similar effects on the failure rate of cooperatives and conventional 
firms. The pattern of risk for new firms, however, is found to be dif-
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ferent: new cooperatives have a honeymoon period when commitment 
is high and risk of closure is lower than that for conventional firms, 
although risks increase later on (Pérotin 1997). 
The Mondragon system of cooperatives in Spain also deserves 
mention here. The Mondragon Corporation is the largest worker coop-
erative in the world; it consists of a federation of worker cooperatives in 
the Basque region of Spain. While there have not been studies focused 
on survival of individual cooperatives in Mondragon, the survival and 
growth of the overall system since the 1950s is consistent with the 
idea that employee ownership can promote survival. The survival of 
the Mondragon system is undoubtedly enhanced by a supportive infra-
structure that includes a university providing graduates and technical 
assistance to the cooperatives, and a bank providing financial capital 
and assistance with financial planning. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
As described in Chapter 3, we compiled the data set by merging 
Standard and Poor’s Industrial Compustat database on publicy traded 
firms and the Form 5500 pension plan data collected by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor for the years 1999–2010. The Compustat database pro-
vides information on firm characteristics like total employment, indus-
try, financial information, and reason for firm failure, while the Form 
5500 pension plan database contains detailed information on employee 
ownership in defined contribution plans and employee stock option 
plans (ESOPs). We matched firm records from the Compustat data and 
Form 5500 data, using each firm’s unique IRS employer identification 
number. 
Also as described in Chapter 3, our data set is made up of the full 
sample of publicly traded companies in the United States, which is an 
important improvement over data sets drawn from special surveys suf-
fering from small sample sizes and bias from self-selection of respon-
dents. A further advantage is the 12-year span of our data set, covering 
a decade when the United States experienced two recessions, in 2001 
and 2008; this allows us to examine how employee ownership firms 
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ship companies. We also have a rich array of measures of employee 
ownership at companies, including the presence of employee ownership 
through pension programs and ESOPs, and the extent of such employee 
ownership in terms of total participation and the share of the firm owned 
by workers. One limitation is that firm disappearance is uncommon in 
general, especially among firms that have gone public. While we have 
enough disappearances to enable meaningful analysis, the low likeli-
hood of disappearance makes it more difficult to establish significant 
differences, which makes any significant differences we do find all the 
more noteworthy. It should also be noted that our results are based on 
the universe of publicly traded companies over this time period, but that 
they might not fully generalize to closely held companies, which are 
generally smaller and have a different industrial distribution. 
We estimate Cox proportional hazards regressions to predict the 
likelihood of firm failure.3 The main independent variable of interest in 
our hazard models is the employee ownership variable. Our hypothesis 
is that the relative hazard ratio for this variable should be between zero 
and one, indicating a lower “hazard” or likelihood of failure for EO 
firms than non-EO firms, on average. The regressions also include firm 
controls, including firm size, union status, and industry. 
We first estimate regressions in which we treat any disappearance 
of a firm from the Compustat database as a firm failure. However, com-
panies may disappear as independent entities when they merge or are 
acquired by another company, and this can actually signal success in 
some cases, as other firms want to acquire or merge with successful 
companies. Compustat provides reasons for deletion of firms that no 
longer appear in that database, including acquisition, merger, bank-
ruptcy, and liquidation. We therefore also estimate models in which 
firm failure is defined strictly as bankruptcy or liquidation. 
As in the analysis of employment stability, we consider six differ-
ent measures of employee ownership in our empirical analyses: 1) any 
employee ownership, 2) presence of an ESOP, 3) employee owner-
ship stock per employee, 4) employee ownership—percentage owned,
5) employee owners as a percentage of employees, and 6) ESOP partici-
pants as a percentage of employees. 
Table 4.1 shows average probabilities of firm disappearance by 
presence of employee ownership in the pooled analysis sample, and it 
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Table 4.1  Firm Disappearance by Presence of Employee Ownership 
Mean (%) Obs. Mean (%) Obs. 
Any employee ownership No employee ownership 
Disappeared for any reason 5.2 17,981 7.6 77,874 
Disappeared because of 0.2 17,981 0.4 77,874 
bankruptcy or liquidation 
Have ESOP No ESOP 
Disappeared for any reason 4.9 8,027 7.4 87,828 
Disappeared because of 0.2 8,027 0.4 87,828 
bankruptcy or liquidation 
EO% of company EO% of company 
owned > 5% owned < 5% 
Disappeared for any reason 4.9 3,342 7.2 92,513 
Disappeared because of 0.2 3,342 0.4 92,513 
bankruptcy or liquidation 
NOTE: “Disappeared for any reason” = dummy variable equaling 1 if firm i in year t
dropped out of the data set for any reason (including bankruptcy, merger/acquisition, 
liquidation, reverse acquisition, no longer publicly traded, no longer files with SEC); 
0 otherwise. “Disappeared because of bankruptcy or liquidation” = dummy variable 
equaling 1 if firm i in year t went bankrupt or was liquidated; 0 otherwise. 
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database, matched to Standard and 
Poor’s Compustat data on publicly traded companies in the United States, 1999–2011. 
to disappear for any reason and also less likely to disappear because 
of bankruptcy or liquidation. The likelihood of disappearance for any 
reason in a given year is 5.2 percent for firms with any employee own-
ership and 7.6 percent for firms with no employee ownership, while 
the likelihood of disappearance due to bankruptcy or liquidation is 0.2 
percent for firms with any employee ownership and 0.4 percent for 
firms with no employee ownership. These differences are similar when 
we compare firms with more than 5 percent of the company owned by 
employees and those with less than 5 percent employee ownership. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates failure rates through 2010 among firms that 
were observed and either had or did not have employee ownership in 
1999.4 The two lines in each panel represent the share of 1999 firms 
that disappeared in each ensuing year, by presence of any employee 
ownership in 1999.5 As seen in Panel A, the share of firms that disap-
peared was lower among firms that had employee ownership in 1999 
than among those that did not have employee ownership, until the year 
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Figure 4.1  Failure Rates of 1999 Firms by Employee Ownership 








Have any EO in 1999 
No EO in 1999 







NOTE: Tracks the share of 1,664 firms with “any employee ownership” and 8,242 firms 
with “no employee ownership,” as observed in 1999, that were no longer observed in 
ensuing years. 
SOURCE: Data are from USDOL Form 5500 pension database, matched to Standard 
and Poor’s Compustat data on publicly traded companies in the United States, 1999– 
2010. 
lar in Panel B for firms with and without ESOPs and in Panel C for 
firms where the share of the firm owned by employees is above and 
below 5 percent. 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
In Table 4.2, we summarize the hazard ratios from Cox proportional 
hazard regressions predicting the likelihood of firm disappearance 
(based on more detailed regression results in Appendix Table 4A.1). 
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Figure 4.1  (continued) 








Had ESOP in 1999 
No ESOP in 1999 







NOTE: Tracks the share of 645 firms with “any ESOPs” and 9,262 firms with “no 
ESOPs,” as observed in 1999, that were no longer observed in ensuing years. 
where we treat any disappearance of a firm from the data as a firm fail-
ure (column 1) and from the model where we define firm failure strictly 
as bankruptcy or liquidation (column 2). 
Column 1 of Table 4.2 provides strong evidence that EO firms are 
less likely to disappear than non-EO firms, and the results are statisti-
cally significant for all the employee ownership variables in our analy-
sis. As seen in the first entry in column 1, the relative hazard ratio asso-
ciated with any EO is 0.786 and significant, meaning that EO firms were 
only 78.6 percent as likely as non-EO companies to disappear in any 
year over the 1999–2010 period. Second, firms with ESOPs were 82.1 
percent as likely as non-ESOP firms to disappear in any year. Third, 
the value of EO stock per worker was associated with a higher survival 
probability: an extra $1,000 of employee ownership stock was linked 
to a 0.5 percent lower risk of disappearing. This means that, since the 
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Figure 4.1  (continued) 








EO percent owned > 5% in 1999 
EO percent owned < 5% in 1999 







NOTE: Tracks the share of 366 firms with EO percentage of company owned >5% and 
9,542 firms with EO percentage of company owned <5%, as observed in 1999, that 
were no longer observed in ensuing years. 
mean value of employee ownership stock among employee owners 
was $10,613, average employee ownership was linked to a 5.307 per-
cent lower risk of disappearing in any given year. Fourth, the share of 
the firm owned by employees had a big impact on firm survival: firms 
where the share of the firm owned by employees was 5 percent or more 
were only 77.2 percent as likely to disappear as firms with less than a 
5 percent share of employee ownership. Finally, the share of workers 
participating in employee ownership and ESOPs was also negatively 
related to the likelihood that a firm would disappear: specifically, an 
increase in the share of the firm’s employee owners from 0 percent to 
100 percent was associated with a 22.4 percent lower risk of disappear-
ing in any given year, and an increase in ESOP participants at the firm 
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Table 4.2  Summary of the Relationship between Employee Ownership 
and Firm Survival from Cox Proportional Hazard Regressions 





for any reason or liquidation 
Any EO 0.786 0.928 
ESOP 0.821 0.900 
EO stock per worker 0.987 0.776 
EO percentage of company owned >5% 0.772 0.813 
Employee owners as % of all employees 0.776 0.800 
ESOP participants as % of all employees 0.756 0.512 
NOTE: Each cell contains the estimated hazard rate from a Cox Proportional Hazard 
Regression predicting the likelihood of firm death for each EO variable in turn. Full 
regression results are reported in appendix tables. Each regression controls for firm 
size, union status, and industry. Bold figures indicate that the hazard estimate is statis-
tically significantly lower than 1.00 (p < 0.05). 
Turning to column 2 of Table 4.2, using the more stringent firm 
failure measure of bankruptcy or liquidation, we see that EO firms were 
less likely than non-EO firms to experience bankruptcy or liquidation 
in any given year over the 1999–2010 period; however, most of the 
hazard rates do not achieve statistical significance at the 5 percent level. 
One important reason for the loss of statistical significance is that the 
sample size of firms that experienced bankruptcy or liquidation is far 
smaller than the sample size of those that disappeared from the data set 
for any reason (only 303 firms over the 1999–2010 period as opposed 
to 6,100 firms). We therefore are cautious about relying too heavily on 
this second set of estimates. The only employee ownership measure for 
which the hazard rate is statistically significant in column 2 is EO stock 
per worker, which reveals that firms with an extra $1,000 of EO stock 
were linked to a 22.4 percent lower risk of experiencing bankruptcy or 
liquidation in any given year during the 1999–2010 period. 
To what extent does employment stability mediate or facilitate the 
positive influence of employee ownership on a firm’s likelihood of per-
sisting through negative economic downturns? We investigated whether 
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fied in the above analysis might be partially explained by the employ-
ment stability effect of employee ownership. To explore this, we added 
a control for employment variability to the Cox proportional hazard 
regression for each employee ownership measure examined above. The 
idea is to compare the relative hazard ratio in each employee ownership 
regression before versus after employment variability is controlled for. 
The employment variability measure we constructed for this purpose is 
the standard deviation of annual change in the natural log of employ-
ment in each company from 1999 to 2010. Appendix Table 4A.2 pres-
ents the counterparts of the estimates for firm disappearance for any 
reason where we also control for employment variability in the Cox 
proportional hazard regressions. If the relative hazard ratio after con-
trolling for employment variability is closer to one than in the similar 
specification in column 1 of Table 4.2 that does not control for employ-
ment variability, then we can say that employment stability appears to 
help explain the positive link between employee ownership and firm 
survival. This is only true in the models where employee ownership is 
measured by whether the firm has any employee ownership and by the 
share of workers at the firm participating in employee ownership. In 
the regressions using the other employee ownership variables, the haz-
ard ratio is further from one than it was in the column 1 specifications 
from Table 4.2. Therefore, employment stability does not appear to be 
a major factor in explaining the link between employee ownership and 
firm survival.
We close this section with a discussion about some caveats. It is 
important to note that the empirical analysis above does not identify 
a causal relationship, but simply an observed correlation between 
employee ownership and firm survival. The fact that employee owner-
ship firms persist for longer periods of time may partially reflect self-
selection of both the firms and the workers employed at the EO firms. 
For example, it may be that employee ownership firms are more likely 
to self-select into markets or sectors where firm dissolution is more 
rare; we have tried to address this concern by including industry con-
trols in our hazard regressions. Additionally, there may be self-selection 
of workers into EO firms in a way that makes these firms more likely 
to persist. Workers may self-select by unobservable characteristics that 
can affect firm survival. As Chiaporri and Salanié (2003) point out, a 
combination of unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous matching 
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of agents to employment contracts can create selection based on the 
parameters of interest. For example, if more productive or motivated 
workers are drawn to work at firms that share wealth with their employ-
ees through their EO schemes, then these firms may be more likely to 
succeed during turbulent times. 
Alas, selection is a potential threat to identifying a causal relation-
ship in all studies using nonexperimental data (Kremer 1997). Selec-
tion bias is most effectively controlled for through random assignment 
in true experiments. While there have not been any true experiments 
in the survival of employee ownership firms, it is worth noting that 
true experiments have been conducted regarding the economic perfor-
mance effects of group-based incentives, with results indicating causal 
effects on performance. A randomized field experiment shows favor-
able effects of firm-based financial incentives on turnover and produc-
tivity (Peterson and Luthans 2006). This is complemented by labora-
tory experiments conducted by Frohlich et al. (1998), who find higher 
productivity in researcher-designed “employee-owned firms,” and by 
Mellizo (2013), who finds that when subjects are randomly assigned to 
shared versus individual flat-wage compensation contracts, shared pay 
motivates higher individual performance, even in the absence of other 
high-performance workplace practices like decision-making autonomy. 
While randomized experiments are hard to imagine on the topic of 
firm survival, these results call out for innovative research strategies to 
determine the causal role of employee ownership. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that publicly traded companies in the United 
States with employee ownership programs were more likely to survive 
the last two recessions. From a research perspective, this is impor-
tant because it raises questions about the mechanisms and workplace 
dynamics underlying employee ownership and firm survival, suggest-
ing that employee ownership may affect firm incentives and policies 
in a way that enhances firm sustainability. It is possible, for example, 
that employee ownership combines with employee involvement, job 
training, and job security to create an “ownership culture” that may not 
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only improve short-term performance but also contribute to employee 
commitment and innovative ideas that enhance long-term survival. We 
shed more light on this possibility in the next chapter. 
From a policy perspective, our finding that firms with employee 
ownership were more likely to survive these recessions is an important 
result, because higher survival rates among employee ownership com-
panies could lead to lower job loss rates and unemployment. Employee 
ownership may therefore serve as an economy-wide policy instrument 
to lower job loss through increasing the likelihood of firm survival. This 
indicates positive externalities on the overall economy and government 
expenditures (e.g., for unemployment compensation and social pro-
grams) that would justify supportive public policy, given the large eco-
nomic and social costs of unemployment resulting from firm closings. 
Notes 
1. However, it is important to note that recent laboratory experiments conducted by 
Mellizo (2013) in which subjects are randomly assigned to shared versus indi-
vidual flat-wage compensation contracts show that shared pay motivates higher 
individual performance even in the absence of other high-performance workplace 
practices like decision-making autonomy. 
2. We also tested probit models predicting firm death, and these had a similar pattern 
and strength of results. 
3. The Cox proportional hazards model specifies that the hazard rate (i.e., the prob-
ability of failure) for firm j with characteristics Xj is 
h(t|Xj) = h (t) × exp(Xjβ) ,0 
and no functional form is imposed on the baseline hazard h0(t), which is assumed 
to be the same for all observations. The semiparametric nature of the Cox model 
makes it more appealing than other hazard models, which make parametric 
assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard like the Weibull model. One 
firm’s hazard is thus simply a multiple of another’s, with a constant relative hazard 
ratio given by 
h(t/Xj) / h(t|Xm) = exp(Xjβ) / exp(Xm β). 
Specifications with Weibull survival models also yielded similar results. 
4. These figures pertain to firm failure for any reason; figures for failure strictly due 
to bankruptcy or liquidation appear similar despite the considerably smaller sam-
ple sizes. 
5. A similar pattern is observed when we compare trajectories by presence of 
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Table 4A.1  Relationship between Employee Ownership and Firm Survival: Cox Proportional Hazard Regressions 
Predicting Firm Survival over 1999–2010 
Panel A: Any EO 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disappeared Disappeared Disappeared Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. 
for any for any for any of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or 
reason reason reason liquidation liquidation liquidation 
Any EO 0.841*** 0.752*** 0.786*** 0.740* 0.743* 0.928 
(0.0290) (0.0276) (0.0291) (0.122) (0.126) (0.164) 
Employment 0.984*** 0.982*** 0.929*** 0.925*** 
(0.00219) (0.00247) (0.0236) (0.0238) 
Union pension plan 0.925 0.964 0.939 1.056 
(0.0518) (0.0551) (0.256) (0.301) 
Industry controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 95,855 82,900 82,900 95,855 82,900 82,900 
Number of firms 13,580 12,461 12,461 13,580 12,461 12,461 
Number of failures 6,869 6,100 6,100 341 303 303 
Time at risk 2.720e + 07 1.890e + 07 1.890e + 07 2.720e + 07 1.890e + 07 1.890e + 07 
Log pseudo likelihood −63,269 −54,310 −54,201 −3,121 −2,669 −2,588 
NOTE: Column entries are hazard ratios. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 
0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Panel B: ESOP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. 
Disappeared Disappeared for Disappeared of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or 
for any reason any reason for any reason liquidation liquidation liquidation 
ESOP 0.801*** 0.747*** 0.821*** 0.585** 0.653 0.900 
(0.0409) (0.0405) (0.0453) (0.155) (0.177) (0.258) 
Employment 0.984*** 0.981*** 0.926*** 0.924*** 
(0.00229) (0.00257) (0.0243) (0.0236) 
Union pension plan 0.898* 0.935 0.924 1.053 
(0.0499) (0.0533) (0.253) (0.305) 
Industry controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 95,855 82,900 82,900 95,855 82,900 82,900 
Number of firms 13,580 12,461 12,461 13,580 12,461 12,461 
Number of failures 6,869 6,100 6,100 341 303 303 
Time at risk 2.720e + 07 1.890e + 07 1.890e + 07 2.720e + 07 1.890e + 07 1.890e + 07 
Log pseudo likelihood −63,272 −54,326 −54,216 −3,120 −2,669 −2,588 
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 
level. 
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Table 4A.1  (continued) 
Panel C: EO Stock per Worker 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. 
Disappeared for Disappeared Disappeared of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or 
any reason for any reason for any reason liquidation liquidation liquidation 
EO stock per worker 0.988*** 0.985*** 0.987*** 0.741*** 0.743*** 0.776*** 
(0.00236) (0.00253) (0.00243) (0.0720) (0.0710) (0.0681) 
Employment 0.983*** 0.980*** 0.928*** 0.927*** 
(0.00229) (0.00256) (0.0243) (0.0236) 
Union pension plan 0.902** 0.940 1.130 1.305 
(0.0498) (0.0531) (0.303) (0.363) 
Industry controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 95,240 82,721 82,721 95,240 82,721 82,721 
Number of firms 13,562 12,458 12,458 13,562 12,458 12,458 
Number of failures 6,821 6,088 6,088 337 302 302 
Time at risk 2.702e + 07 1.883e + 07 1.883e + 07 2.702e + 07 1.883e + 07 1.883e + 07 
Log pseudo likelihood −62,775 −54,193 −54,088 −3,060 −2,636 −2,561 
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 
level. 
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Panel D: EO Percent of Company Owned > 5% 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. 
Disappeared for Disappeared for Disappeared for of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or 
any reason any reason any reason liquidation liquidation liquidation 
EO % of company 0.807*** 0.717*** 0.772*** 0.602 0.635 0.813 
owned >5% 
(0.0640) (0.0587) (0.0637) (0.248) (0.259) (0.337) 
Employment 0.983*** 0.980*** 0.925*** 0.924*** 
(0.00231) (0.00257) (0.0246) (0.0237) 
Union pension plan 0.876** 0.920 0.896 1.050 
(0.0485) (0.0521) (0.241) (0.296) 
Industry controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 95,855 82,900 82,900 95,855 82,900 82,900 
Number of firms 13,580 12,461 12,461 13,580 12,461 12,461 
Number of failures 6,869 6,100 6,100 341 303 303 
Time at risk 2.720e + 07 1.890e + 07 1.890e + 07 2.720e + 07 1.890e + 07 1.890e + 07 
Log pseudo likelihood −63,278 −54,332 −54,217 −3,122 −2,670 −2,588 
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 
level. 
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Table 4A.1  (continued) 
Panel E: Employee Owners as Percentage of All Employees 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. 
Disappeared for Disappeared for Disappeared for of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or 
Variables any reason any reason any reason liquidation liquidation liquidation 
Employee owners as % 0.848*** 0.727*** 0.776*** 0.602** 0.596** 0.800 
of all employees 
(0.0379) (0.0332) (0.0359) (0.140) (0.134) (0.186) 
Employment 0.984*** 0.981*** 0.929*** 0.926*** 
(0.00224) (0.00251) (0.0234) (0.0233) 
Union pension plan 0.906* 0.946 0.951 1.075 
(0.0505) (0.0539) (0.257) (0.304) 
Industry controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 95,424 82,899 82,899 95,424 82,899 82,899 
Number of firms 13,565 12,461 12,461 13,565 12,461 12,461 
Number of failures 6,834 6,100 6,100 339 303 303 
Time at risk 2.700e + 07 1.890e + 07 1.890e + 07 2.700e + 07 1.890e + 07 1.890e + 07 
Log pseudo likelihood −62,917 −54,316 −54,207 −3,100 −2,668 −2,588 
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 
level. 
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Panel F: ESOP Participants as Percentage of All Employees 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. Disappeared bec. 
Disappeared for Disappeared for Disappeared for of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or of bankruptcy or 
any reason any reason any reason liquidation liquidation liquidation 
ESOP participants as 0.706*** 0.661*** 0.756*** 0.291** 0.336** 0.512 
% of all employees 
(0.0544) (0.0507) (0.0590) (0.147) (0.161) (0.251) 
Employment 0.983*** 0.980*** 0.927*** 0.926*** 
(0.00230) (0.00256) (0.0243) (0.0234) 
Union pension plan 0.889** 0.929 0.936 1.087 
(0.0492) (0.0527) (0.253) (0.309) 
Industry controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 95,611 82,898 82,898 95,611 82,898 82,898 
Number of firms 13,565 12,461 12,461 13,565 12,461 12,461 
Number of failures 6,842 6,100 6,100 341 303 303 
Time at risk 2.710e + 07 1.890e + 07 1.890e + 07 2.710e + 07 1.890e + 07 1.890e + 07 
Log pseudo likelihood −63,000 −54,325 −54,216 −3,117 −2,667 −2,587 
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 
level. 
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Table 4A.2  Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates of the Role of Employment Stability in Explaining the Relationship 
between Employee Ownership and Firm Survival 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disappeared for Disappeared for Disappeared for Disappeared for Disappeared for Disappeared for 
any reason any reason any reason any reason any reason any reason 




EO assets per employee 0.985*** 
(0.00306) 
EO % of company owned 0.698*** 
>5% (0.0716) 
Employee owners as % of 0.792*** 
all employees 
(0.0427) 
ESOP participants as % of 0.693*** 
all employees 
(0.0650) 
Employment 0.982*** 0.981*** 0.981*** 0.980*** 0.981*** 0.981*** 
(0.00305) (0.00314) (0.00312) (0.00316) (0.00309) (0.00314) 
Union pension 0.981 0.967 0.971 0.947 0.965 0.960 
(0.0654) (0.0640) (0.0639) (0.0623) (0.0641) (0.0633) 
Employment variation 0.987 0.995 0.992 0.996 0.989 0.995 
(0.0247) (0.0246) (0.0247) (0.0246) (0.0247) (0.0246) 
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Observations 78,660 78,660 78,488 78,660 78,660 78,659 
Number of firms 9,627 9,627 9,626 9,627 9,627 9,627 
Number of failures 4,072 4,072 4,064 4,072 4,072 4,072 
Time at risk 1.510e + 07 1.510e + 07 1.505e + 07 1.510e + 07 1.510e + 07 1.510e + 07 
Log pseudo likelihood −35,672 −35,677 −35,588 −35,678 −35,675 −35,676 









Why Do Employee 
Ownership Firms Have Greater
Stability and Survival? 
Why are employee ownership firms more likely to be stable and 
long lived? Two possible explanations are that either greater compen-
sation flexibility or greater productivity in employee ownership firms 
accounts for their greater stability and survival. This chapter presents 
evidence on both these explanations. As will be seen, neither of them 
provides a full explanation of the greater stability and survival, although 
the evidence suggests support for a refined version of the productivity 
explanation. 
PAY LEVELS AND FLEXIBILITY 
There are two possible ways in which employee ownership may 
provide pay flexibility to the firm in times of financial distress. First, 
employers’ yearly contributions to employee ownership plans may be 
more flexible than other types of compensation. When sales decline or 
other types of negative demand shocks occur, the company may con-
tribute less stock (or money to buy stock) to employee accounts in an 
employee ownership plan. This type of flexibility is no different from 
the flexibility that employers have in all defined contribution pension 
plans: the fact that the contribution is made in stock rather than cash (as 
in a deferred profit-sharing plan) does not affect the perceived cost of 
labor from the firm’s perspective. 
A second source of pay flexibility may be linked specifically to 
employee ownership if the company stock substitutes in whole or part 
for fixed pay. The total shareholder return (annual dividend and change 
in company stock value) may be seen as part of employees’ annual 
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decrease in company stock value provides an automatic pay cut for 
workers. Since the fixed component of pay would be lower in this cir-
cumstance, firms will have less incentive to lay off workers and are 
likely to have a higher probability of survival. 
There is very little prior evidence on the topic of flexibility in pay 
among employee ownership firms. We explore this with our Form 
5500–Compustat data, measuring pay flexibility in four ways. The first 
two ways consider just the employer’s average annual contribution to 
compensation per employee, measured either as total compensation per 
employee (which is reported by fewer than one-fourth of all firms in 
any year) or merely as total pension expenses per employee (reported 
for all firms). Compensation flexibility in both cases is computed as the 
standard deviation of compensation per employee at a given firm over 
the period 1999–2011, after adjusting for annual compensation growth.1 
In Appendix Table 5A.1 we show that there is little statistically signifi-
cant association between employee ownership and these two measures 
of flexibility (columns 1 and 2). Not surprisingly, there is more flex-
ibility associated with employee ownership when shareholder returns 
are included as part of compensation. The third and fourth measures 
in Table 5A.1 add dividends and stock price changes to the employee-
owned stock (columns 3 and 4) and show greater pay flexibility asso-
ciated with all the employee ownership measures. The coefficients 
in Panel A indicate that considering shareholder return as part of pay 
roughly doubles the yearly variation in pay.2 
Pay Levels 
While these last two results point to greater pay risk associated with 
employee ownership, a key issue in considering the effects of pay flex-
ibility is whether the variable pay substitutes for fixed pay or benefits. If 
it does not substitute, and instead comes wholly on top of market levels 
of fixed pay and benefits, then employee ownership firms will not enjoy 
any cost advantage in hiring or retaining workers when bad times hit. 
(In economic terms, the marginal cost of labor would be just as high 
among employee ownership firms as among those without employee 
ownership.) In addition, employees would not face extra financial risk 
in their basic compensation, since the pay variability would occur in the 
above-market component of their compensation. 
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As reviewed in Chapter 1, past research indicates that employee 
ownership tends to come on top of market levels of pay. It is rare for 
employee ownership to be part of wage or benefit concessions, and 
studies find that employee ownership firms have average base wages 
that are as high as, or higher than, those in comparable firms without 
employee ownership. There is also clear evidence that base pay levels 
do not generally decrease when ESOPs are adopted in public compa-
nies (Kim and Ouimet 2014). 
Employee ownership also generally comes on top of standard pay 
among the firms in our data set. We summarize key results in Table 
5.1, with more detail in Appendix Table 5A.2. We present estimates 
that include comparisons both within and between firms (using random-
effect specifications) and only within firms (using fixed-effects specifi-
cations). The former comparisons answer the question of how employee 
ownership relates to compensation levels in general, while the latter 
comparisons answer the question of what types of changes occur in 
compensation within a firm when employee ownership is increased or 
decreased. As can be seen in Table 5.1, employee ownership is associ-
ated with higher compensation under either type of comparison. The 
most telling result is found in column 1 of Table 5.1. If employee own-
ership substitutes for standard pay, then it should be associated with 
lower levels of pay, excluding pension contributions. It is not—in fact, 
nonpension pay is positively linked to employee ownership, with fig-
ures indicating between 1.4 and 7.4 percent higher pay across three 
key measures of employee ownership. Column 2 shows that pension 
contributions are significantly higher (11.6 percent) in companies with 
employee ownership, and that they increase by an average of 4.4 per-
cent when companies adopt employee ownership. Combining pension 
and nonpension data, column 3 shows that employee ownership is 
linked to 4.0 percent higher compensation in general and a 2.1 percent 
increase within a firm when employee ownership is added to compensa-
tion. These pay differentials are strengthened when shareholder returns 
are considered part of employee compensation, as shown in column 4. 
In sum, there is no support for the idea that employee ownership 
generally substitutes for standard pay or benefits. Given this, there is no 
plausible mechanism by which increased pay flexibility under employee 
ownership can lead to increased stability or survival. 
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Table 5.1  Summary of Results on Pay Levels and Employee Ownership (%) 
Total nonpension Total pension Total compensation 
compensation per contribution per Total compensation plus shareholder 
employee employee per employee returns per employeea 
Average pay difference associated with any 
employee ownership in firm 
Comparing both across and within firms 3.5 11.6 4.0 4.5 
Comparing only within firms over time 1.4 4.4 2.1 3.7 
Average pay difference associated with 100% 
of employees covered by employee 
ownership plan 
Comparing both across and within firms 7.4 20.7 8.8 8.3 
Comparing only within firms over time 6.1 13.8 7.7 7.0 
Average pay difference associated with mean 
of employee-owned stock per employee 
($10,540) 
Comparing both across and within firms 2.6 4.9 2.6 3.3 
Comparing only within firms over time 2.1 1.6 2.3 2.9 
NOTE: Based on results from Appendix Table 5A.2. Results for “comparing both across and within firms” are based on random-effects 
specifications, and results for “comparing just within firms over time” are based on fixed effects. Figures in bold are based on statistically 
significant differences at the 95% level. 
a Column 4 is based on smaller sample than column 3, accounting for lower figures in rows 3 and 4. 
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PRODUCTIVITY 
The greater stability and survival of employee ownership compa-
nies may be due in part to higher productivity. This may happen in one 
of two ways. First, there may be a simple mediation effect if employee 
ownership leads to higher productivity (through increased effort, coop-
eration, monitoring of coworkers, attraction of higher-quality workers, 
etc.) and the higher productivity leads to greater stability and survival. 
In this case, the effect of employee ownership should disappear when 
controlling for productivity level. Second, there may be a more complex 
mechanism through which employee ownership influences survival and 
stability through productivity: firms that give stock to employees may 
try to create an employee ownership culture with a greater sense of 
ownership, and the sense of ownership is contingent on increased job 
security, since it is difficult to make employees feel like owners when 
they are just as likely to be laid off as in any other firm. In this case, 
employee ownership may be linked to greater productivity in general; 
however, even when firms are suffering productivity problems, they 
may want to restrict layoffs in order to maintain an ownership culture, 
so that ownership may have an effect on stability and survival even 
when the firm undergoes low-productivity years. As reviewed in Chap-
ter 1, prior research strongly supports the idea that employee ownership 
is linked to higher productivity, on average. 
We first add to the prior literature by estimating the relationship 
between employee ownership and productivity in our sample. To do 
this, we use a standard specification based on a production function to 
control for other influences on productivity. In addition, we examine 
within-firm as well as between-firm variation.3 
The findings from our data set are consistent with prior results. As 
summarized in Table 5.2 (with further detail in Appendix Table 5A.6), 
employee ownership is linked to 2.9 percent higher productivity using 
both within- and between-firm comparisons, and 2.4 percent higher 
productivity using only within-firm comparisons, and the former but 
not the latter comparison can reject a zero effect. Employee owner-
ship is also strongly linked to productivity when measured as stock per 
employee (a 2.5–2.6 percent increase associated with average stock per 
employee) or as percentage of employees covered (a 7.8–12.5 percent 
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Average productivity difference associated with any 
employee ownership in firm 
Comparing both across and within firms 2.9 
Comparing only within firms over time 2.4 
Average productivity difference associated with median 
level of employee-owned stock per employee ($10,540) 
Comparing both across and within firms 2.6 
Comparing only within firms over time 2.5 
Average productivity difference associated with 100% of 
employees covered by employee ownership plan 
Comparing both across and within firms 7.8 
Comparing only within firms over time 12.5 
NOTE: Based on results from Appendix Table 5A.6. Results for “comparing both 
across and within firms” are based on random-effects specifications, and results for 
“comparing only within firms over time” are based on fixed effects. Figures in bold 
are based on statistically significant differences at the 95% level. 
increase associated with 100 percent of employees covered). Further 
results in Appendix Table 5A.6 show that the companies in which 
employees own less than 3 percent of company stock have stronger 
productivity increases than the companies with a higher percentage 
owned, as is consistent with the findings of Kim and Ouimet (2014) 
that small ESOPs are associated with stronger productivity effects than 
large ESOPs. 
These results make it plausible that higher productivity accounts for 
the greater stability and survival of employee ownership firms uncov-
ered in the preceding two chapters. To investigate this, we add pro-
ductivity controls to the benchmark regression models for employment 
stability from Chapter 3 and for firm survival from Chapter 4. We test 
for the influence of productivity as a simple mediator in three ways: first 
by controlling for the prior year’s productivity level, then by controlling 
for the average productivity level of the company, and finally by con-
trolling for the interaction of productivity and employment changes.4 
Our tests show that there is no simple connection between the pro-
ductivity of employee ownership firms and their survival or stability. 
 
 
Why Do Employee Ownership Firms Have Greater Stability? 119 
We do not report a summary table, since the estimated employee owner-
ship effects change very little when controlling for productivity, and the 
results are easily summarized in the text. We report regression results in 
Appendix Table 5A.3 and 5A.4. As can be seen in column 2 of Appen-
dix Table 5A.3, higher average productivity predicts a higher likelihood 
of disappearance for any reason, which probably indicates that high-
productivity firms are tempting targets for mergers and acquisitions. 
Using the stricter definition of firm death (columns 4–6 of Appendix 
Table 5A.3), higher productivity not surprisingly predicts a lower like-
lihood of firm death due to bankruptcy or liquidation, although a zero 
effect can be rejected only for productivity in the prior year. 
For our purposes, the important result is that employee ownership 
remains a statistically significant predictor of greater survival in col-
umns 1 to 3 after controlling for either productivity variable (i.e., com-
paring the hazard rate for employee ownership in column 1, which does 
not control for productivity, against the hazard rate for employee own-
ership in columns 2 and 3, which do have productivity controls). This 
is true whether employee ownership is measured as the presence of any 
employee ownership (Panel A), average stock per employee (Panel B), 
or percentage of employees covered (Panel C). Controlling for produc-
tivity likewise has little effect in columns 4 to 6 on the relationship of 
employee ownership to disappearance due to bankruptcy or liquidation. 
A similar exploration of firm employment stability is undertaken 
in Appendix Table 5A.4. Columns 1 and 4 present regressions equiva-
lent to those in Appendix Table 3A.1 in Chapter 3 but are restricted to 
firms with complete information for productivity estimates. We com-
pare these to columns 2 and 5, which add the prior year’s productivity 
as a control, and to columns 3 and 6, which add interactions between 
a firm’s average productivity and the demand shocks. The response to 
recessionary pressures (measured by increases in the unemployment 
rate) remains lower among employee ownership firms after controlling 
for the prior year’s productivity level (columns 2 and 5). It is possible 
that the relationship is due to high-productivity firms having smaller 
responses to recessionary pressures; however, controlling for interac-
tions of unemployment changes with average firm productivity shows 
that employee ownership continues to be linked to smaller employment 
cutbacks as the unemployment rate increases (columns 3 and 6). 
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Therefore, productivity does not explain in a simple way the greater 
survival and stability of employee ownership firms. It is possible that 
external factors explain the greater survival and stability—for example, 
perhaps customers of employee ownership firms are more loyal because 
of better customer service. It is also possible that internal factors associ-
ated with employee ownership are responsible—for example, perhaps 
employee ownership companies are less likely to have high executive 
pay and incentives skewed toward excessively risky decisions (such as 
executive stock options that reward executives for strong gains but do 
not penalize them for losses).5 
We can shed some light on why employee ownership firms have 
greater stability by conducting further tests of the productivity relation-
ship. Employee ownership firms may lay off fewer workers in reces-
sions and instead assign workers to training or other activities that can 
build skills or long-term productivity. While these activities may not 
contribute to short-term productivity, they can help maintain a sense 
of ownership and ownership culture that contribute to long-term pro-
ductivity and survival. If this is the case, short-term productivity for 
employee ownership firms should go down in recessions as workers 
are retained while sales decrease (i.e., the numerator in the productivity 
measure decreases more than the denominator decreases). 
This idea receives strong support, as summarized in Table 5.3, 
based on coefficients reported in Appendix Table 5A.5. This is based 
on productivity regressions that interact employee ownership with the 
unemployment rate, testing whether the relationship of employee own-
ership to productivity is related to the level of demand in the economy. 
While Table 5.2 showed that employee ownership is generally associ-
ated with higher productivity, Table 5.3 shows that this relationship is 
contingent on overall demand in the economy. There is a positive main 
effect on the employee ownership measures but a negative interaction 
between employee ownership and the unemployment rate, indicating 
that the relative productivity of employee ownership firms is high when 
the economy is strong and decreases when the economy is weak, as the 
employee ownership firms lay off fewer workers. For example, Table 
5.3 shows that in a nonrecession year with unemployment at 5.0 per-
cent, employee ownership firms would have a productivity advantage 
of 2.4–4.0 percent, while in a recession year with 8.0 percent unem-
ployment, their productivity would be 1.0–1.8 percent lower than that 
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Table 5.3  Summary of Results on Employee Ownership and Productivity in Recession and Nonrecession Years 
Employee ownership Employee ownership 
productivity difference productivity difference 
(in %) in nonrecession (in %) in recession year 
year (unempl. = 5%) (unempl. = 8%) 
Average productivity difference (in %) associated with any employee 
ownership in firm 
Comparing both across and within firms 4.0 −1.8 
Comparing only within firms over time 3.3 −1.0 
Average productivity difference (in %) associated with median level of 
employee-owned stock per employee ($10,540) 
Comparing both across and within firms 3.1 0.9 
Comparing only within firms over time 3.6 2.9 
Average productivity difference (in %) associated with 100% of 
employees covered by employee ownership plan 
Comparing both across and within firms 9.5 2.5 
Comparing only within firms over time 20.9 16.3 
NOTE: Based on coefficients from Appendix Table 5A.5. Results for “comparing both across and within firms” are based on random-
effects specifications, and results for “comparing only within firms over time” are based on fixed effects.
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of other comparable firms. Measuring employee ownership as average 
stock per employee or share of employee covered also shows that the 
productivity advantage of employee ownership firms goes down in 
recessions. 
While there are no direct data available on how employee ownership 
firms reassign workers when demand decreases, these results combined 
with the lower layoffs in employee ownership firms support the idea 
that they are more likely to put workers in training or in other activities 
that do not contribute to short-term productivity but may build skills 
that support greater long-term productivity. A complementary explana-
tion concerns the firm’s incentive to retain workers with firm-specific 
skills when demand decreases, given human capital theory’s predic-
tion that firms will share in the costs of firm-specific training and thus 
have an incentive to maintain the relationship in order to recoup those 
costs. Investing in an employee ownership culture, in which workers 
are encouraged to cooperate and share information, may be seen as a 
type of investment in firm-specific skills, since cooperation and infor-
mation sharing may be contingent on building trust and good relation-
ships in a team environment, and such relationships are firm specific. In 
other words, companies may not want to disrupt good working relation-
ships, both among coworkers and between managers and employees, 
by engaging in layoffs when demand declines, since those relationships 
may be important for higher productivity after demand recovers. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter explores the reasons behind the higher survival and 
stability of employee ownership firms, focusing on the potential roles 
of pay flexibility and productivity. Pay is found to be more flexible 
in employee ownership firms only when total shareholder return is 
counted as part of compensation, but this is not a plausible mechanism 
for greater stability or survival, given that the employee ownership 
comes on top of standard pay and benefits. Any increased flexibility 
comes in above-market compensation, and the firm would not experi-
ence labor cost savings when bad times occur. 
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The relation of productivity to employee ownership is more promis-
ing for providing lessons about stability and survival. Consistent with 
prior evidence, we find that employee ownership is linked to higher 
productivity on average, when making comparisons both among firms 
and within firms. The effect of employee ownership on survival and sta-
bility, however, is maintained when controlling for productivity levels. 
The lesson comes from examining the contingent nature of the relation-
ship between productivity and employee ownership: consistent with 
the lower layoffs of employee ownership firms, they have lower short-
term productivity from retaining more workers as the economy wors-
ens. Retaining more workers may help their long-term productivity, by 
helping to maintain an employee ownership culture through retaining 
firm-specific skills and relationships that support such a culture. If this 
interpretation is correct, it suggests there are strong positive externali-
ties from employee ownership because of the fewer layoffs. This helps 
to decrease unemployment levels in the economy and maintain pur-
chasing power for greater macroeconomic stability under recessionary 
pressures. 
Notes 
1. To avoid having inflation and general wage trends contribute to the measured vari-
ation, the natural logarithm of compensation per employee was first regressed on 
year dummies, and flexibility was computed as the within-firm standard deviation 
of the residuals in firms with at least three observations. 
2. Using the data underlying results in Appendix Table 5A.1, EO firms are predicted 
to have pay variability of 0.08 in the absence of EO, and 0.18 with EO, in column 
3, while the predicted pay variability in column 4 is 0.41 in the absence of EO and 
0.81 with EO. 
3. We use a translog specification, with industry and year effects, and both fixed-
effects and random-effects models. The estimating equation is 
(1) Ln(Q/L) = (ßl−1) × Ln(Lit) + ßk × Ln(K)it + ßll × [Ln(Lit) × Ln(Lit)] + 
ß  × [Ln(K ) × Ln(K )] + ß  × [Ln(L ) × Ln(K )] +kk it it kl it it 
ß  × EO  +ß  × DB  + ß  × DC  + p it d it dt it 
ß  × (industry dummies) + ß  × (year dummies) + u  + eit ,ind y i 
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where Q = output, defined as sales + inventory change 
L = total employees 
K = capital stock 
EO = employee ownership 
DB = defined benefit plan 
DC = defined contribution plan 
ß = coefficients 
u = firm-level fixed or random effect 
e = error term 
subscript i = firm i, t = year t 
4. To generate the productivity variables, a regression based on the productivity 
model in endnote 3 was run without the employee ownership and pension vari-
ables, and with 12 year dummies and 72 industry dummies as controls. Average 
productivity is calculated as the average within-firm residual, and productivity last 
year is calculated as last year’s residual. 
5. There is no available research on executive pay in employee ownership compa-





Table 5A.1  Pay Flexibility and Employee Ownership 
Std. dev. (ln Std. dev. (ln of Std. dev. (ln of 
Dependent Std. dev. (ln of of pension total comp. + EO pension contrib. 
variable: total compensation contributions per shareholder returns + EO shareholder 
per employee) employee) per employee) returns per employee) 
Panel A 
Any EO lasting full period 0.004 0.006 0.100*** 0.403*** 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
n 1,013 4,609 1,231 4,294 
R-squared 0.295 0.041 0.353 0.174 
Panel B 
Average EO stock per employee 0.000 0.001 0.005*** 0.012*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
n 1,248 5,664 1,502 5,308 
R-squared 0.267 0.044 0.352 0.113 
Panel C 
Average % of employees with EO −0.004 0.006 0.119*** 0.572*** 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) 
n 1,238 5,645 1,494 5,295 
R-squared 0.267 0.044 0.311 0.171 
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Panel D 
Average % of firm owned by employees 
>0% and <=1% 0.015 0.023* 0.034** 0.252*** 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) 
>1% and <=3% 0.006 0.004 0.052*** 0.425*** 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) 
>3% and <=5% 0.004 0.081*** 0.107*** 0.475*** 
(0.019) (0.026) (0.022) (0.031) 
>5% and <=10% 0.006 0.012 0.131*** 0.519*** 
(0.018) (0.026) (0.021) (0.030) 
>10% 0.028 0.028 0.235*** 0.672*** 
(0.024) (0.036) (0.029) (0.043) 
n 1,211 5,341 1,494 5,289 
R-squared 0.276 0.044 0.333 0.197 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
Based on OLS regressions of pay variability measures on EO measures. Each panel represents results of separate regressions. Control 
variables include average ln(firm size), average presence of defined benefit plans, average presence of defined contributions plans, plus 
71 two-digit industry dummies. Std. dev. = standard deviation; EO = employee ownership; ln = natural logarithm. Standard deviation is 
calculated only for firms with three or more pay observations over the 1999–2011 period.
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Average EO stock per 
employee 
Number of firm-year obs. 
Number of firms 
0.002*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
14,568 12,561 52,494 





0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
14,280 12,303 12,111 10,241 42,202 35,674 
1,977 1,859 1,870 1,748 6,528 6,083 
Panel C 
% of employees with EO 
Number of firm-year obs. 
Number of firms 
0.084*** 0.074*** 0.188*** 0.129*** 0.071*** 0.059*** 0.080*** 0.068*** 0.363*** 0.127*** 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.035) 
13,582 11,593 49,952 42,909 13,291 11,331 11,211 9,361 40,283 33,807 
1,989 1,853 7,043 6,676 1,960 1,826 1,850 1,714 6,476 5,967 
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Panel D 
% of firm owned by 
employees 
>0% and <=1% 0.024 0.020 0.112*** 0.050** 0.019 0.008 0.063*** 0.070*** 0.228*** 0.149*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023) (0.031) 
>1% and <=3% 0.067*** 0.052*** 0.161*** 0.053** 0.058*** 0.040*** 0.058*** 0.038* 0.312*** 0.059* 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027) (0.035) 
>3% and <=5% 0.053*** 0.029 0.128*** 0.024 0.046*** 0.018 0.045** 0.009 0.343*** 0.008 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.027) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.034) (0.043) 
>5% and <=10% 0.037** 0.010 0.109*** ˗0.021 0.030* 0.000 ˗0.023 ˗0.072*** 0.558*** 0.154*** 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.030) (0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.025) (0.038) (0.049) 
>10% 0.051** 0.031 0.087*** ˗0.028 0.045** 0.021 0.043 0.009 0.541*** 0.027 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.034) (0.038) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.032) (0.050) (0.065) 
Number of firm-year obs. 13,247 11,341 47,073 40,490 13,040 11,160 11,536 9,697 40,628 34,157 
Number of firms 1,906 1,770 6,583 6,221 1,880 1,745 1,839 1,705 6,471 5,974 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Based 
on panel regressions with random or fixed firm effects, and AR(1) correction. Panels A to D represent results of separate regressions. 
Control variables include ln(employment), presence of defined benefit plans, presence of defined contribution plans, plus 12 year dum-
mies and 71 two-digit industry dummies. EO = employee ownership; ln = natural logarithm. 
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Table 5A.3  Productivity and Firm Survival 
Dependent 
variable: Disappeared for any reason 
Disappeared because of 
bankruptcy or liquidation 
Panel A 
−0.352*** −0.354*** −0.351*** 0.173 0.179 0.135 
Any EO 
Average productivity 
Productivity in prior year 













Observations 54,983 54,983 55,818 54,983 54,983 55,818 
Panel B 
Average EO stock per employee 
Average productivity 
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Panel C 
% of employees with EO 
Average productivity 




























NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
Based on Cox survival regressions. Panels A, B, and C represent results of separate regressions. Control variables include employment, 
bargaining status, and nine industry dummies. EO = employee ownership. 
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Table 5A.4  Productivity and Firm Stability 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Negative demand shock: −0.02790*** −0.02778*** −0.02797*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028*** −0.028*** 
UR increase 
(0.00137) (0.00137) (0.00139) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Positive demand shock: 0.11089*** 0.11094*** 0.11157*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 
UR decrease 
(0.00710) (0.00711) (0.00717) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Productivity in prior year 0.01997*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
(0.00522) (0.005) (0.005) 
Negative shock interacted 
with: 
EO assets per employee 0.00070*** 0.00068*** 0.00070*** 
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) 
EO share of employees 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ESOP share of employees 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Average firm productivity 0.00083 0.001 0.001 
(0.00238) (0.002) (0.002) 
Positive demand shock 
interacted with: 
EO assets per employee 0.00084* 0.00078* 0.00087** 
(0.00043) (0.00043) (0.00043) 
EO share of employees −0.002 −0.003 −0.002 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
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ESOP share of employees −0.006 −0.006 −0.007 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Average firm productivity −0.01023 −0.010 −0.010 
(0.01235) (0.012) (0.012) 
Observations 54,881 54,881 54,881 54,983 54,983 54,983 54,983 54,983 54,983 
R-squared 0.20139 0.20245 0.20143 0.201 0.203 0.202 0.202 0.203 0.202 
Number of firms 8,900 8,900 8,900 8,902 8,902 8,902 8,902 8,902 8,902 
NOTES: Dependent variable = change in ln(employment). UR = unemployment rate. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant 
at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Based on fixed-effects panel regressions with controls 
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Table 5A.5  Productivity and Employee Ownership in Recessions 
Dependent Ln[(sales + inventory 
variable: change)/employees] 
Random effects Fixed effects 
(1) (2) 
Panel A 
Any EO 0.134*** 0.102*** 
(0.026) (0.026) 
Unemployment rate −0.021*** −0.025*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Any EO × unemployment rate −0.019*** −0.014*** 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Number of firm-year obs. 70,124 59,689 
Number of firms 10,435 9,122 
Panel B 
Average EO stock per employee last year 0.006*** 0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment rate −0.024*** −0.027*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Avg. EO stock last year × unemployment rate −0.001*** −0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Number of firm-year obs. 62,280 52,695 
Number of firms 9,585 8,332 
Panel C 
% of employees with EO 0.201*** 0.255*** 
(0.040) (0.041) 
Unemployment rate −0.022*** −0.023*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
% of employees with EO × unemployment rate −0.022*** −0.013** 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Number of firm-year obs. 67,753 57,367 
Number of firms 10,386 9,038 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant 
at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Based on panel regressions with 
random or fixed firm effects, and AR(1) correction. Panels A to C represent results 
of separate regressions. Based on translog specification, with control variables 
including ln(employment) alone and squared, ln(capital stock) alone and squared, 
ln(employment) × ln(capital stock), presence of defined benefit plans, presence of 
defined contribution plans, plus time trend and 71 two-digit industry dummies. EO = 
employee ownership; ln = natural logarithm. 
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Table 5A.6  Productivity and Employee Ownership 
Dependent variable: Ln[(sales + inventory change)/employees] 
Random effects Fixed effects 
Panel A 
Any EO 0.029** 0.024 
(0.013) (0.016) 
Number of firm-year obs. 70,124 59,689 
Number of firms 10,435 9,122 
Panel B 
Average EO stock per employee 0.002*** 0.002*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Number of firm-year obs. 62,280 52,695 
Number of firms 9,585 8,332 
Panel C 
% of employees with EO 0.075*** 0.118*** 
(0.019) (0.021) 
Number of firm-year obs. 67,753 57,367 
Number of firms 10,386 9,038 
Panel D 
% of firm owned by employees 
>0% and <=1% 0.037** 0.033* 
(0.016) (0.018) 
>1% and <=3% 0.036* 0.045** 
(0.019) (0.021) 
>3% and <=5% 0.028 0.022 
(0.023) (0.026) 
>5% and <=10% 0.020 0.009 
(0.026) (0.029) 
>10% 0.023 0.005 
(0.033) (0.036) 
Number of firm-year obs. 62,628 53,160 
Number of firms 9,468 8,245 
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant 
at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. Based on panel regressions with 
random or fixed firm effects, and AR(1) correction. Panels A to D represent results 
of separate regressions. Based on translog specification, with control variables 
including ln(employment) alone and squared, ln(capital stock) alone and squared, 
ln(employment) × ln(capital stock), presence of defined benefit plans, presence of 
defined contribution plans, plus 12 year dummies and 71 two-digit industry dummies. 




Conclusions and Policy Implications 
In this final chapter, our goal is to bring together all the evidence 
we have presented in this book to make a case for why broad-based 
employee ownership is appealing, discuss the policy case for employee 
ownership, and present a list of concrete policy recommendations that 
can increase the prevalence of employee ownership in our society. 
Broad-based sharing in company ownership and in the rewards of 
economic prosperity has a long and rich history in the United States, 
with roots that can be traced to the philosophies of the founding fathers. 
As described in Chapter 2, George Washington’s Treasury secretary, 
Alexander Hamilton, was a proponent of share schemes and advanced 
a bill, which Congress passed in 1792 and Washington signed into law, 
that strengthened share schemes in the cod fishing industry. Thomas 
Jefferson’s Treasury secretary, Albert Gallatin, spearheaded a profit-
sharing plan in 1795 in his Philadelphia Glass Works company because 
he believed such a system was important for the newly developing U.S. 
democracy. With a similar motive, Thomas Jefferson greatly expanded 
the size of the United States through the Louisiana Purchase with the 
goal of increasing opportunities for broad-based ownership of land, and 
this goal was later realized through the Homestead Act. Broadening 
the distribution of wealth was a key underlying driver for the creation 
of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and their institutionaliza-
tion through the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), spearheaded by Louisiana senator Russell Long. 
Interest in employee ownership can be categorized into four main 
sources, as described in Chapter 1: 
1) Increased economic performance 
2) Greater job security and firm survival 
3) More-broadly shared prosperity 
4) Less labor-management conflict and higher quality of work life 
Our findings in this book are focused on the second source of inter-
est—job security and firm survival—but also shed light on the issues of 
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economic performance and broadly shared prosperity. Using matched 
Form 5500–Compustat longitudinal data on the universe of publicly 
traded firms in the United States from 1999 to 2011, we have examined 
how firms with employee ownership programs weathered the reces-
sions of 2001 and 2008 relative to firms without employee ownership 
programs. Our key results are that 
• employee ownership firms exhibit greater employment stability 
in the face of economy-wide and firm-specific shocks (Chapter 
3) and 
• employee ownership firms had greater survival likelihood in 
the face of recession, with a lower likelihood of failure (bank-
ruptcy or liquidation) or of disappearance because of mergers 
and acquisitions (Chapter 4). 
• These findings are not explained by greater compensation flex-
ibility or lower wages in employee ownership firms; in fact, 
employee ownership tends to come on top of base pay that is 
higher, and no more variable, than in other firms. Productivity 
is higher on average in employee ownership firms, and the pat-
tern across the business cycle suggests a plausible explanation 
for the stability and survival results: the productivity advantage 
of employee ownership firms drops during recessions, indicating 
that they may retain more workers as a way to facilitate long-
term productivity and survival by helping maintain firm-specific 
human capital and working relationships (Chapter 5). While 
workplace culture may also help to explain the greater survival 
of employee ownership firms, we do not have enough informa-
tion to provide a strong explanation for the increased survival. 
Overall, these results imply that at a macroeconomic level, employee 
ownership may play a role in decreasing unemployment and helping to 
stabilize the economy under recessionary pressures. 
One interesting question is which dimensions of employee owner-
ship contribute the most to stability and survival. Throughout the book, 
we have described the potential benefits of employee ownership on 
workplace culture: it can contribute to an environment that promotes 
higher productivity, greater stability, and higher rates of survival. We do 
not have measures of workplace culture in this data set, so we cannot 
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draw conclusions on its importance. In comparing the different measures 
of employee ownership, we find that stability and survival are linked to 
greater degrees of employee ownership as measured by employer stock 
per employee, percentage of company owned by employees, and share 
of employees who are employee owners. While each of these is impor-
tant, the greatest explanatory power comes from the share of employees 
who are employee owners, which is the variable most consistent with 
the idea that it is a cooperative workplace rather than direct financial 
incentives that drive the improved productivity, stability, and survival.1 
LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
As in all nonexperimental research, we cannot fully resolve the 
issue of causality. It may be that firms that are more stable or have a 
higher likelihood of survival are more likely to adopt employee owner-
ship, or that there are other unobserved factors—such as management 
quality or philosophy, or use of other high-performance work poli-
cies—that explain the relationship. Even if other factors are responsible 
for the stability and survival, it is nonetheless noteworthy that these are 
accompanied by employee ownership, indicating that employee own-
ership may be used to reinforce the stability and survival prospects. 
In addition, there is a plausible story that employee ownership plays 
a direct role based on the finding that the productivity advantage of 
employee ownership firms disappears in recessions as they hold onto 
workers, possibly as a way of maintaining an ownership culture and 
retaining firm-specific skills. The evidence is clear that employee own-
ership is associated with higher productivity on average, but this has 
not been studied across the business cycle. While laboratory and field 
experiments that control for selection and other biases have shed light 
on the productivity effects and financial incentives of employee owner-
ship (Frohlich et al. 1998; Mellizo 2013; Peterson and Luthans 2006), it 
is difficult to conceive of an experiment that tests the employment sta-
bility and survival effects of employee ownership. A promising method 
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additional analysis of large data sets with in-depth case studies of how 
employee ownership firms cope with recessions. 
One advantage of our data is that we have the entire population, 
rather than just a sample, of U.S. publicly traded companies over the 
1999–2011 period. This means that we do not have to worry about gen-
eralizing our results to the population for this period; however, there is 
still uncertainty about generalizing the results of this period to future 
periods, and to firms without employee ownership if they were some-
how induced or made to adopt employee ownership. If some of the pub-
lic policies discussed below were implemented and were successful in 
increasing the adoption of employee ownership, it is possible that these 
new adopters would not exhibit the same behavior as the employee 
ownership firms we have studied, because (for example) they may be 
taking advantage of tax incentives rather than developing an ownership 
culture that supports stability and survival. There are, however, a num-
ber of countries (such as the United Kingdom) where the government 
implemented tax incentives (Oxera Consulting 2007a,b,c), as discussed 
earlier in this book, and the findings on firms’ responses to these law 
changes are generally consistent with our findings for the United States 
in this book. 
There is also a question as to how our results from publicly traded 
firms would generalize to closely held firms.2 Closely held firms, also 
known as privately held firms, are firms that are owned by a relatively 
small number of shareholders or employees and whose shares are not 
traded on stock market exchanges but, rather, are offered and exchanged 
privately. The results in this book are consistent with the one existing 
study on stability and survival among closely held firms with employee 
ownership (Blasi, Kruse, and Weltmann 2013), but there is a clear need 
for further research. Closely held firms with employee ownership tend 
to have a greater share of the firm that is employee owned on average 
and are more likely than publicly traded firms to be majority owned by 
employees,3 which makes them particularly important to study in order 
to understand the impacts of high levels of employee ownership and the 
role of a highly concentrated ownership culture in stability, survival, 
and productivity. The major research difficulty in studying closely held 
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Finally, our core analysis on employment stability and firm survival 
is based on data on employee ownership in deferred compensation 
plans. This is largely a data availability constraint—we use one of the 
few large data sets available that contain information on employee own-
ership—namely, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Form 5500 pension 
records. A large portion of employee ownership in the United States 
occurs through ESOPs, which are covered by Form 5500. Data on direct, 
broad-based employee ownership at the firm or worker level—through 
ESOPs, exercised stock options, or open market purchases—are scarce. 
There is information on compensation composition, including compen-
sation consisting of stock and stock option holdings, available from the 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat Execucomp database, but this focuses 
only on the top five highest-paid executives at each firm and therefore 
precludes the analysis of broad-based employee ownership. We believe 
the collection of large-scale data on all forms of employee ownership 
holdings within firms would be of tremendous benefit to employee 
ownership research. 
Given the results in this book and the high stakes involved in 
employment stability and firm survival, there would be a potentially 
large payoff to further research on employee ownership in both publicly 
traded and closely held firms. 
POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS 
Public policies are commonly justified by market failures such as 
externalities, incomplete information, and public goods. With respect to 
the second source of interest—greater job security and firm survival— 
the decision to lay off workers or close a firm can create a number of 
negative externalities, including 
• negative effects on consumer purchasing power and aggregate 
demand, 
• higher government expenditures on unemployment compensa-
tion and other forms of support for dislocated workers and eco-
nomically stressed families,4 
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• potentially harmful effects on communities, such as increased 
crime and a decreased tax base for supporting schools and infra-
structure, and 
• potentially harmful social and personal effects, such as marital 
breakups and alcohol abuse. 
These externalities are illustrated by an estimate based on the Gen-
eral Social Survey (GSS) data that the federal government saved $13.7 
billion per year in tax revenue and unemployment compensation over 
the period 2002–2010 because of the lower layoff rates among employee 
owners (Employee Ownership Foundation 2013; Rosen 2013). 
The third source of interest in employee ownership—more-broadly 
shared prosperity—can also be seen as a form of positive externality 
that may justify supportive public policy. Raising the incomes of mid-
dle- and lower-class workers can help mitigate the increasing inequal-
ity of income and wealth. Extreme inequality may pose dangers to the 
viability of a representative democracy, as was believed by several of 
the founding fathers and argued recently by Stiglitz, among others. Sti-
glitz (2013a,b) has also made the case that inequality is harmful to mac-
roeconomic growth and stability. This is supported by OECD studies 
that have found that countries with increasing inequality had slower 
growth, are more prone to recessions, and had more severe responses 
to the 2008 crisis.5 The greater economic stability in more equal societ-
ies may be due to more purchasing power in the hands of middle- and 
lower-class citizens. In addition, low incomes and high inequality are 
linked to a variety of economic and social problems, including reduced 
educational performance, mental and physical health problems, teen-
age births, incarceration, and decreased economic prospects and social 
mobility for one’s children (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). The evidence 
presented here is consistent with prior evidence that employee owner-
ship tends to come on top of other pay and wealth, indicating that it can 
play a role in improving incomes across the economic spectrum. 
The first and fourth sources of interest in employee ownership—
1) increased economic performance and 4) less labor-management con-
flict and higher quality of work life—do not generally involve exter-
nalities, since most of the gains should be captured by the participating 
firms and workers (although there may be some positive externalities 
such as increased innovation that create wider benefits, and higher eco-
nomic performance and lower conflict may contribute to employment 
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growth and stability, which have positive effects on the economy as 
a whole).6 If employee ownership helps to create higher productivity 
and better quality of work life, this should provide good private incen-
tives for firms to adopt employee ownership, as well as for workers to 
join such firms. There may nonetheless be a case for supportive public 
policy based upon information problems or institutional barriers that 
limit the adoption of employee ownership. The “public good” nature of 
information means that there can be a role for government to improve 
economic performance by spreading information on best practices. This 
is a common role for government; examples include the long history 
of agricultural extension services through land-grant universities (since 
1887) to spread information on best practices in farming, and employer 
education conducted by the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration on safety practices that can decrease employer costs and improve 
firm performance by reducing turnover and lost work time from injuries 
and illnesses. 
In sum, employee ownership can improve individual firm perfor-
mance, and this provides a case for firms to adopt these performance-
enhancing practices. The government can play a valuable role in spread-
ing this information. Furthermore, there is a strong case for supportive 
public policy of employee ownership if employee ownership firms lay 
off fewer workers and are more likely to survive, because of the nega-
tive externalities of layoffs and firm failures that are borne by workers, 
families, communities, and the larger economy and society. In addition, 
a policy case can be built on increasing broad-based prosperity, which 
can reduce inequality and strengthen democracy. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The European Union (EU) highlighted employee ownership and 
profit sharing in its four reports from 1991 to 2008 on Promotion of 
Employee Participation in Profits and Enterprise Results (the “Pepper 
Reports”), including a summary of the variety of fiscal and tax incen-
tives provided by EU countries for employee ownership, stock options, 
and profit sharing in its 2008 report. The United States has had a variety 
of incentives for ESOPs since the 1980s, though some were eliminated 
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during the first Bush administration.7 Employer contributions to ESOPs 
are tax deductible, but that is the case for all eligible pension plans. The 
major surviving tax incentive specific to employee ownership is the 
ability for retiring owners to avoid capital gains taxes if they sell to an 
ESOP owning at least 30 percent of the company. 
Past experience has shown that government legislation promoting 
employee ownership can increase the adoption and use of employee 
ownership schemes. This was true with tax advantages for firms that 
have ESOPs in the United States, tax incentives to individuals for 
employee ownership in the United Kingdom, and tax advantages to 
firms and individuals for profit sharing in France, among other exam-
ples. There is a positive correlation between supportive legislation and 
prevalence, making a case that government backing and support can be 
effective. 
So what are some concrete policy recommendations that can lead to 
increased prevalence of broad-based employee share ownership in our 
society? In what follows, we present a list of policy options. The empiri-
cal analysis in this book has focused on the population of U.S. firms that 
are publicly traded on the stock market, and many of the policy options 
below have special relevance to publicly traded firms. However, there 
are several options that will encourage closely held companies, also. 
In particular, options 1, 2, 3, and 5, below, will likely have the biggest 
impact on publicly traded firms, while the other options will be relevant 
for both publicly traded and closely held companies. 
We start our list of recommendations with tax and expenditure poli-
cies that our results suggest may be justified by positive externalities 
such as lower unemployment. Such policy options include the follow-
ing seven: 
1) Inducing financial firms to invest in or loan money to firms 
with broad-based employee ownership. Financial institutions 
could deduct a portion of the interest income from loans to 
employee ownership firms. This policy existed in the 1980s, 
but despite its success in stimulating interest among finan-
cial institutions, the program was cut back as part of deficit-
reduction measures. 
2) Restricting tax deductibility of incentive pay for top execu-
tives (stock, bonuses, stock options) to companies that have a 
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similar type of incentive for all employees. This would make 
incentive plans subject to the same conditions that exist for 
pensions and health insurance plans: they are tax deductible 
only if they are broad based, not limited to a small group. This 
would not prevent firms from having special incentive plans 
for top executives, but would simply establish that such plans 
should not be given tax privileges. 
3) Making a minimal program of employee ownership a pre-
condition for the numerous corporate tax incentives in the tax 
code. This is in the spirit of George Washington’s tax credit 
for cod fishing ships that required a profit-sharing plan for any 
ships benefiting from the credit. 
4) Expanding eligibility for exemption from capital gains taxes 
for retiring owners selling to an ESOP. Currently, this is not 
available to S corporations, which have been rapidly growing 
in the past decade.8 
5) Extending tax deductibility from deferred to nondeferred 
employee ownership plans. At present, the United States only 
provides tax incentives for deferred employee ownership plans 
through the ERISA law of 1974. Federal legislation could 
provide tax breaks to firms that provide direct broad-based 
employee ownership of stock and stock options. 
6) Requiring or favoring firms with broad-based ownership plans 
in government procurement. The federal government currently 
spends large sums procuring goods and services from compa-
nies. These firms that hold federal contracts are already subject 
to certain special laws—for example, laws that govern diver-
sity. The U.S. government could require federal contractors to 
incorporate broad-based employee ownership for doing busi-
ness with the federal government (for example, based on the 
objective scorecard proposed in point 12, below). 
7) Having federal, state, and local economic development author-
ities give special attention to firms with broad-based equity 
ownership programs in awarding tax abatements to businesses 
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Apart from the tax and expenditure policies, there are a number of 
policies to spread information or break down institutional barriers that 
limit adoption; these low-cost policies can be justified under each of the 
reasons for interest in employee ownership. Policies that spread infor-
mation include these five: 
8) Establishing a national commission to “assess different inclu-
sive capitalist initiatives and evaluate ways to improve and 
promote them in American society” (Blasi, Freeman, and 
Kruse 2013, p. 198). The United States has often used com-
missions to draw attention and expertise to national issues. 
9) Establishing an office to support broad-based capitalism within 
the White House, reviewing public policies and working with 
the private sector to publicize and encourage best practices. 
10) Providing seed grants to establish employee ownership 
resource centers in each state, modeled on the successful cen-
ters in Ohio and Vermont that assist local businesses with tran-
sitions to employee ownership and provide ongoing technical 
assistance, support, and networking. 
11) Establishing programs in the Small Business Administration to 
educate owners of small- and medium-sized businesses about 
employee ownership options and to work with state programs 
in providing assistance to firms in creating employee owner-
ship trusts to buy out retiring owners. 
12) Creating an objective scorecard of employee ownership and 
profit sharing that can be used by workers, investors, and gov-
ernment officials in measuring the spread of these programs 
in individual firms and throughout the economy. This would 
include common measures of the percentages of employees 
covered by different types of plans, and the size and distribu-
tion of their financial stakes in these plans. 
A final low-cost idea offered here involves expanding state policies 
to allow firms with financial participation to form and operate more 
easily: 
13) In the United States, firms incorporate at the state level, and 
states can amend their laws on corporations to create legal 
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tent with the goal of broadening financial participation. Since 
2010, 28 states have passed laws creating a new type of cor-
poration, called the B corporation (short for “Benefit corpora-
tion”), which makes it easier for businesses to take employee, 
community, and environmental interests into consideration 
when making decisions.9 A firm with broad-based employee 
ownership incorporated as a B corporation has greater options 
to maintain its programs than a firm incorporated under differ-
ent provisions. 
CONCLUSION 
Combining our findings with the empirical literature as a whole, 
we see a body of evidence showing that, despite the theoretical free-
rider and financial risk objections raised against it, employee ownership 
is generally linked to increased worker performance and commitment, 
enhanced employee cooperation toward firm goals, lower turnover, 
higher pay, and wealth, as well as to improved firm-level outcomes such 
as higher productivity, greater employment stability, and firm survival. 
These benefits—particularly the greater stability and survival, which 
can help the overall economy by reducing unemployment and resist-
ing recessionary pressures—can provide a clear justification for wide-
spread government support to broaden employee ownership programs. 
Notes 
1. The t- and z-statistics are higher on employee owners as a percentage of all 
employees, compared to the other measures, indicating that this employee own-
ership variable explains a greater share of the variance in stability and survival. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the finding that the magnitudes of moving from 
no employee ownership to high levels of employee ownership are larger for this 
variable. 
2. Relatedly, our analysis of publicly traded companies skews our sample toward 
large and historically successful companies. 
3. “The median percentage ownership for ESOPs in public firms is about 5 percent. . . . 
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about 4,000 companies now 100 percent employee-owned by ESOPs (a percent-
age that is increasing steadily).” See NCEO (2016). 
4. Unemployment Insurance is experience rated so that employers with higher levels 
of layoffs pay more into the  system, but the payments are not directly propor-
tional, so that employers do not absorb the full costs of the UI for workers they 
dismiss. 
5. See Aiginger and Guger (2012); OECD (2016). 
6. See Brill (2012) on how S corporation ESOPs may justify favorable tax treatment 
by contributing to higher economic growth in both recession and nonrecession 
periods. 
7. A federal law that was instituted in 1984 with strong bipartisan support, Internal 
Revenue Code Section 133 gave tax incentives to banks and financial institutions 
lending money to companies to set up ESOPs. Specifically, the lender was able to 
deduct from its corporate taxes half of its interest income on the loan to set up the 
ESOP. Section 133 provided a strong incentive for setting up ESOPs at corpora-
tions, but it was substantially repealed during the first Bush administration in a 
wave of deficit-reduction initiatives. 
8. A bipartisan bill has been introduced to extend this tax treatment to S corporations. 
See http://esca.us/2016/04/press-release-esca-members-to-testify-today-at-house 
-committee-on-small-business-hearing-on-s-esops/. 
9. The purpose of a B corporation includes creating general public benefit, which is 
defined as a material positive impact on society and the environment. A B corpo-
ration’s directors and officers operate the business with the same authority as in a 
traditional corporation but are required to consider the impact of their decisions 
not only on shareholders but also on society and the environment. The B corpora-
tion can refuse to sell itself to the highest bidder, can operate with a longer-term 
financial horizon, and can value interests beyond maximizing shareholder wealth, 
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